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ABSTRACT 
 
The refugee crisis that used to concern some European countries turned into a pan-
European problem when the EU agreed that all member states should accept and take care 
of some refugees. In April 2015, Estonia was confronted with this reality and its political 
elite, organised in six different parties that are represented in the national parliament, 
started to discuss the issue at hand. This thesis employs a quantitative content analysis in 
order to map out the positions of the different parties, along with their argumentative style, 
general attitude towards refugees, and main topics that were connected with the refugee 
question. The different positions are also compared across two different platforms, first 
the respective party webpage, second the parliament faction section. The second aim of 
this thesis is to examine how the different parties would adjust their discourse according 
to internal and external events that happened between April 2015 and March 2016. Finally, 
there is a discussion on the validity of the party press release as an individual type of 
media. This model will then be juxtaposed to Hallin’s spheres in order to find out whether 
the old paradigm still has some validity in the modern, interconnected world 
 
Keywords: Estonia, Refugee Crisis, Quantitative Content Analysis, Political 
Communication 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION …………………………………………………………………...5 
CHAPTER I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ……………………….…...4 
1.1 Doing Politics ..…………………………………………………….…....4 
1.2 Political Communication .....……………………………………….8 
1.3 Hallin’s Spheres .....………………………………………………………11 
CHAPTER II. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK …………………..15 
2.1 Research Questions ………………………………………………….15 
2.2 Press Releases as a Separate Genre …………………………………..16 
2.3 Empirical Data ………………………………………………………….18 
2.4 Quantitative Content Analysis ………………………………………….21 
2.5 Operationalisation of Data and Quantification Table …………..22 
2.6 Qualitative Discourse Analysis ………………………………………….29 
2.7 Research Limitations ………………………………………………….31 
CHAPTER III. ANALYSIS OF EMPIRICAL DATA ………………………….33 
3.1 Results of Quantitative Content Analysis ………………………….33 
3.2 Results of Qualitative Discourse Analysis ………………………….59 
CHAPTER IV. DISCUSSIONS ………………………………………………….61 
CONCLUSION …………………………………………………………………65 
BIBLIOGRAPHY …………………………………………………………………67 
APPENDIX A. SOURCE TABLE ………………………………………………….77 
APPENDIX B. ADDITIONAL GRAPHS …………………………………………102 
5 
 
  
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
We should have value-based positions, and not political parties scoring points.  
 Kalle Palling, Chairman of the European Union Affairs Committee in Estonia  
 13.10.2015 
 
The devastating civil war in Syria, ISIS’ actions in the Middle East, and ethnic and 
religious strife in Africa have all contributed to a severe influx of refugees to the relatively 
safe neighbouring states and, eventually, to the European continent in the early months 
of 2014. Since then, the member states of the European Union discuss both within their 
own national parliaments and among each other about how to deal with the more than 1.2 
million refugees that were registered in 2015 alone (Eurostat, 2016). Soon, the law known 
as the Dublin Regulation was put into question; Dublin III, the most recent version of the 
law at the time, stated that the first EU member state where a refugee sets foot would also 
be the state to examine the refugee’s claims to asylum and potentially grant asylum to 
that refugee (European Union, 2013). Whilst the EU member states around the 
Mediterranean Sea had always been the ones to bear the brunt of refugee influx, within 
the context of the crisis at hand this imbalance was drastically increased and countries 
such as Italy soon started to incentivise asylum seekers to move northwards into other EU 
member states and register for asylum there instead (Spiegel, 2013).  
One of the core principles of the European Union, namely the open border policy 
articulated in the Schengen Agreement (European Union, 2009), became a source of 
uncertainty for many countries, particularly for those that had been previously unaffected 
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by immigrants from the southern Mediterranean shores; even high EU Commissioners 
stated that Schengen has to be revised or temporarily suspended in the wake of 
unregistered refugees who could settle where they please while the respective host 
countries had little to no awareness of their presence (WDR, 2015). Within only a few 
months, in April 2015, the European Commission’s Joint Foreign and Home Affairs 
Council published a press release containing a ten-point action plan that suggested an ‘EU 
wide voluntary pilot project on resettlement’ and, more broadly, to ‘consider options for 
an emergency relocation mechanism’ (European Commission, 2015).  
Doubling down on the issue at hand, German Chancellor Angela Merkel proposed 
introducing an EU-wide quota for distributing asylum seekers across Europe in order to 
share the burden of the sudden influx of refugees (Telegraph, 2015). This proposal 
suggested to implement a mechanism comparable to the Königsteiner Schlüssel 
(Königstein key), a German framework that, largely on the grounds of tax revenue and 
population of the different German federal states, determines the distribution of joint 
funding for different endeavours and is now also used for distributing refugees among the 
federal states (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2016). In particular, Merkel’s 
suggestion hit a nerve within most countries previously unaffected by refugee 
immigration because it was a compulsory distribution mechanism determined by a 
country’s financial status and population size rather than by voluntary agreements and 
pledges by individual governments. 
One of the countries that initially categorically opposed this compulsory quota 
system is the Republic of Estonia. While the debate on the technicalities of the quota were 
still ongoing, the Estonian Riigikogu and government rejected the proposed figure of 
1,064 (ERR, 2015a). During the months following Merkel’s initial proposals regarding 
the redistribution of refugees, several events both internationally and within Estonia 
shifted the discourse in different directions until, in March 2016, the first refugees from 
Iraq, Syria, and Yemen set foot on Estonian soil (Postimees, 2016a). It is beyond doubt 
that Estonian public political discourse has experienced and continues to experience 
changes.  
The aim of this thesis is to examine how the different parties that have seats in the 
Estonian parliament stylise the discussion over the period of twelve months, from April 
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2015 until March 2016. In this thesis, the focus will lie on the communication 
channels that the parties fully control, namely their respective party webpages and the 
factions section on the webpage of the Estonian parliament. In the past, many research 
articles have attempted to utilise a holistic approach, however a number of them fall short 
because said approach includes many variables, some of which are incalculable or 
difficult to process through the data that is available to the researcher. This thesis is thus 
puts a strong emphasis on understanding what the parties and individual politicians say 
rather than how it is publicised by independent media outlets or how it is received by the 
public. This approach has been chosen by the author because it provides the reader with 
a clear understanding of what the different parties want their political messages to be 
without any adjustments or filters.   
There are three main questions that will be addressed in this thesis: (1) How do 
the parties’ statements across the two platforms differ regarding argumentation, rhetorical 
instruments, and prioritisation over other topics? (2) Do real-life events have any effect 
on the way the different parties communicate and, if so, what effects do they have?  (3) 
Does this case study fit into the paradigm of Hallin’s spheres of discourse? The first two 
questions will be addressed through quantitative content analysis in order to contribute to 
the existing research on political communication and the causal relationship between 
outside events and inside politics. The third question will employ Hallin’s theorem in a 
completely new environment, namely party statements rather than independent media, 
and test whether its tenets are also usable outside of their usual realm. Finding the answers 
to these three interconnected questions will offer a valuable insight into how and why the 
various Estonian political parties communicated their policies regarding the European 
refugee crisis between April 2015 and March 2016 in the fashion in which they did. In 
order to answer this question, we will first outline the theoretical framework and elaborate 
on the methodological framework.  
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CHAPTER I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Political communication is a vast field that has been developed over the past few decades 
and experienced an increasing degree of mixture with other theories, both of qualitative 
and quantitative, positivist and constructivist nature. It is thus of grave importance for this 
thesis to map out the theory which it treats as its foundation. We will first define what 
doing politics means in this context, then concern ourselves with the question of how the 
term political communication is treated in this thesis, and finally link the paradigm of 
Hallin’s spheres into our theory. 
 
 
1.1 Doing Politics 
 
In the public eye, the mere term ‘politics’ leads many people to think of it as a largely 
biased field that, unlike physics, chemistry, or even other social sciences like history, 
cannot and perhaps should not be approached in an unbiased manner (Heywood, 2013: 
2). Regardless of whether this is an appropriate understanding or not, what certainly holds 
true is the notion that people across the globe engage in it, be it intentionally or tacitly. 
‘Man’, so Aristotle would claim, ‘is by nature a political animal’ (Perseus, 2016) because 
mankind has the ability to communicate through spoken and written language, as well as 
to grasp abstract moral concepts, though the formulation and discussion of such concepts 
is of course up for debate.   
Politics can be understood as the process of negotiating compromise out of a state 
of disagreement; between humans, these negotiations are undertaken through language, 
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but also symbols, pictures, or even silence that all carry meaning and are thus subject to 
interpretation of the originator, the recipient, and the audience. Whatever the style of 
negotiation and whatever the outcome, we can conclude that ‘communication is therefore 
central to politics’ (Hague et al., 1998: 3-4). This appreciation for communication is also 
at the core of Ruth Wodak’s concept of Doing Politics which she devised in her book The 
Discourse of Politics in Action. She elaborates on six dimensions of doing politics that 
play intrinsic roles in the perception and enactment of politics in the public sphere 
(Wodak, 2011: 24):  
1. The staging/performance of politics (the ‘field of politics’ and the ‘habitus’ of 
politicians; front stage); 
2. The everyday life of politicians/politics (the backstage; communities of 
practice; politics du couloir);  
3. The impact of the personality of individual politicians on their ‘performance’ 
(active/passive politicians; proactive / reactive politicians; charisma / attraction / 
credibility / persuasion);  
4. The mass production of politics and politicians (‘making of politicians’ through 
advisers, the media, spin-doctors and so forth); this dimension necessarily 
interacts dialectically with the first two dimensions;  
5. Recontextualization of everyday politics in the media (fiction);  
6. Participation in ‘politics’ (issues of power, ideology, gate-keeping, legitimacy, 
representation, etc.)  
Of these six dimensions, especially number one, three, and six are important for 
this thesis. The performance of politics on the front stage is important to this thesis 
because it relates directly to the choice of sources, namely the party and parliament 
webpages. The importance of individual politicians versus their respective parties is also 
taken into account in this research and will be closely monitored. Finally, questions 
surrounding ideology and legitimacy are absolutely central to this thesis. On the other 
hand, it is very difficult to delve into the everyday life of politicians because most 
researchers can’t get access to these types of information. The ideas stipulated in points 
four and five are beyond the scope of this research precisely because it chooses to ignore 
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the actions of the middleman – the media – and the audience and instead focus on the 
statements issued by the different parties. It would be equally hazardous to interpret how 
the politicians were ‘made’ by spin-doctors, and to put parties’ statements into a context 
which they did not choose or to which they did not intend to be connected. 
The first of the three dimensions of doing politics that are relevant to this thesis is 
the staging and performance of politics. As such, the medium of interaction is crucial 
because it decides the ‘battle ground’ for politics and the potential possibility of dialogue. 
As a first step, it is important to distinguish between, on the one hand, the rare occasions 
where dialogue is possible, for example in a question-and-answer setting or talk shows, 
and, on the other hand, non-interactive means of communication like press releases and 
speeches in parliament. The second step is to ascertain what the communication channel 
is; party websites, social media, and online newspapers tend to have comment sections in 
which the average citizen can express their opinion and interact with fellow citizens, but 
rarely with the politicians that uttered the respective political statements in the first place. 
These types of media are, by creating an illusion of interaction, all contributing to the 
establishment of a ‘one-way communicative street’ (Harvey, 2014: 1335). Online media 
is thus distinctly different from traditional print media and television because the latter 
do not pretend to be interactive; the audience watching a TV news broadcast has no means 
of interaction and the readers of newspapers only have the chance to write a letter to the 
editor which, firstly, has a very low chance of being published and, secondly, still only 
offers the chance of a one-time reply rather than a proper dialogue.  
The second factor which we have mentioned with reference to political discourse 
is the choice of words. As was discussed in the paragraph above, ‘the media, especially 
news formats in television, seem to be reducing complex processes into brief spotlights, 
snippets, or ‘scoops’ (Wodak, 2011: 18). Adjusting to these different types of 
communication is has been a crucial skill ever since and, of course, was soon picked up 
by the politicians and spin-doctors who would attempt to use the nature of the symbiotic 
relationship between the media and the world of politics to their advantage. There are two 
types of adjustments that have to be taken into consideration; firstly, all politicians who 
want to increase the likelihood of gaining airtime on television should be prepared to have 
key sentences that encapsulate their opinion as concisely as possible so the TV stations 
do not have to edit large parts of a long statement; secondly, as Svensson rightly points 
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out, the language used in political speeches has become more simplistic and emotionally, 
thereby leading to a less argumentative climate in which politicians address the public 
directly and much less frequently debate with one another (Svensson, 1993).  
The second dimension of doing politics that is relevant for this thesis is the impact 
of the personality of the respective politicians. Personalisation in politics is by no means 
a new discovery; a certain degree of cult has always surrounded leaders of dictatorships, 
monarchies, and democracies alike, ranging from Caesar in Ancient Rome to Thatcher in 
the United Kingdom of the 1980’s (Giddens, 1998). The personalisation of politicians in 
parliament, however, is a somewhat recent development which recently started attracting 
interest within the study of political science (Renwick & Pilet, 2016). This personalisation 
process within parliament is partially fuelled by particular electoral systems that 
encourage voters to connect with their local representative as much as they traditionally 
align with a particular party. Such structural traits then compete with a nation’s ‘appetite’ 
for personalised politics; for example, one culture might be more prone to appreciating 
charismatic and vociferous politicians whereas another culture appreciates the epitome of 
the ‘silent workhorse’. In this regard, Wodak’s insistence on charisma and attraction is, 
generally speaking, going in the right direction but also shows a relative disregard for 
societies which are not just indifferent towards fanfare but even respond negatively to it.  
Finally, the third dimension of doing politics that is relevant to this thesis is that 
of the style of participation in politics. Wodak refers explicitly to larger phenomena like 
‘power, ideology, legitimacy, representation, and gate-keeping’ (Wodak, 2011: 24). Such 
concepts are often referenced in conjunction with mythologisation, exaggeration, 
understatement, or outright lies. What matters is thus not just the topic that is being 
referred to but also the way it is being portrayed. Thus, we cannot ignore the significance 
of language. Language is regarded by many as one of the most crucial parts of shaping 
political discourse because, for all the different types of medium and styles of discourse, 
language is the unifying factor on which, traditionally, all actors and members of the 
audience agree. Ideally, the language that is being used in political discourse is understood 
by the entire population. Even under such ideal circumstances it must be noted that 
language as a concept always produces the risk of creating ambiguity instead of the 
desired clarity.  
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In discourse, Huckfeldt contends, ‘inaccurately perceived messages may also be 
influential, and for many purposes it is the perceived message that is most important for 
the choice that a citizen makes’ (Huckfeldt, 1998: 998). With this, he takes a matter-of-
fact approach and implicitly underlines the audience’s responsibility to properly dissect 
the statements that they encounter. Hansson, however, is quick to remind us that this 
approach is, at best, naïve about the intentions of the political actors; ‘officeholders may 
choose to represent their actions at high levels of generality and abstractness so that it 
becomes less clear what they actually did or are doing’ just as much as the opposition can 
make claims unsupported by reality (Hansson, 2015: 303).  
Legitimacy and the process of legitimation are also hotly contested in the quest 
for moral superiority; in order to achieve it, politicians often use rhetorical tricks such as 
reference to one’s own importance, legitimacy, past track record of ethical decision-
making, or even narratives that present the audience with a cautionary tale, a logic which 
infers that the actor’s ‘legitimate actions are rewarded and non-legitimate actions are 
punished’ (Van Leeuwen, 2007: 92). Political communication is, of course, not only 
important for the link between politicians and their respective audiences, but also for the 
connection between the politicians and their advisors; flawed communication between 
the advisor team and a politician, Larocca is quick to remind us, can have an equally grave 
impact on that politician’s interaction with the public, particularly when selective 
information is intentionally being withheld in order to divert a particular agenda (Larocca, 
2004).  
 
 
1.2 Political Communication 
 
Political communication, in its most widely accepted definition, describes all acts that are 
‘purposeful communication about politics’ (McNair, 2003: 4) which are publicly 
perceivable for an audience. This audience does not have to be physically present but may 
also seek to attain access to the aforementioned communication through recorded files or 
via the Internet. In the early 2000s, scholars concerned themselves with the question 
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whether the advent of the Internet would facilitate creating a new culture of educational 
exchange or if, in fact, the new technology might soon lead to ‘a new cleavage emerging 
between the information-rich and information-poor’ (Norris, 2003: 120). This sentiment 
of hesitation soon faded away and gave way for a new way of communication, facilitating 
information and goods exchange alike. This novel type of information exchange did not 
go unnoticed in the realm of politics and soon got exploited by party leaders and spin-
doctors alike; online campaigning and political discussions are now a regular occurrence 
in our daily lives and have thus also become a part of how political communication is 
understood. 
 
Figure 1: Elements of political communication (McNair, 2003: 6) 
 As we can see, political communication is based on roughly the same tenets as the 
six dimensions which are found in Wodak’s conceptualisation of doing politics. All three 
main agents, political organisations, the media, and the citizens, act and react according 
to different stimuli which the political scientist hopes to discern. However, the link 
between the different agents can be fragile in itself; a media outlet can decide not to print 
a reader’s letter, citizens often have a confirmation bias which shields them from reading 
newspapers with which they disagree. Similarly, political organisations such as parties 
are at times treated differently by different newspapers according to their own political 
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leanings, and in return a media outlet may often struggle to get proper interviews with 
straightforward and honest politicians. McNair’s concept of how political communication 
works is, at best, rather optimistic and it would be even more fragile if one were to take 
into account individuals’ character traits or even cultures and social practices in different 
countries.  
 Nonetheless, parties can, as Sartori suggests, ‘best be conceived as means of 
communication’ (Sartori, 1976: 28). Since the advent and widespread use of the Internet, 
however, political parties are no longer necessarily tied to the media outlets as the 
middlemen and propagators. Rather, they can set up own communication channels where 
they can directly channel information to the target audience. New ICTs (Information and 
Communication Technologies) give a political party or an individual politician the 
opportunity to have more personalised contact with the population and tailor the content 
to what the citizens wish for (Römmele, 2003: 7).  
In real life, this theory falls somewhat short because newspapers, while they by 
no means possess the monopoly on information as they used to for centuries, are still 
powerful actors. Thus, the websites of political parties are mostly frequented by party 
followers or, more generally, an audience with the suitable confirmation biases already 
in place. The audience is ultimately too small to make a tangible difference in, for 
example, an election and politicians still need to rely on Public Relations work and 
flamboyant behaviour to make headlines in traditional news outlets.  
Regardless of this, party webpages with newsletters and archives continue to exist 
with good reason; it can be argued that, on a small scale, the different parties take on 
responsibility with all the rights and duties that are usually reserved for members of the 
media. The rights would include the ability to publish as often and lengthily as the party 
desires, but there would also be responsibilities; because there is no middleman in this 
scenario, blame for miscommunication can only be assigned to the party that posted the 
message. In practical terms, taking over the role of the media – on whatever scale – also 
means that there is a certain need to practice self-restraint and, in some cases, self-
censorship. After all, the traditional media outlets still exist and frequent the parties’ pages 
to look for misconduct that they can still decry in public with a much larger audience than 
the party page itself would ever have.  
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Thus, the modern era allows political parties to become media outlets themselves, 
albeit small ones, and interact with the electorate according to their own abilities. In the 
following section, this new understanding of who or what constitutes ‘media’ will flow 
into Hallin’s spheres, a paradigm that has so far only been used for traditional media. 
 
1.3 Hallin’s Spheres 
 
Daniel C. Hallin wrote the book The “Uncensored War”: The Media and Vietnam which 
concerned itself with the media’s role and how it developed during the United States’ war 
against North Vietnam (Hallin, 1986). It became the point of reference for many scholars 
who conducted research in media discourse (Mindich 2000, Zuckerman 2013), 
particularly due to a model that is known as Hallin’s Spheres (see Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2: Hallin’s Spheres (Hallin, 1986: 117) 
Moving from the core towards the outer layers, we first find the sphere of 
consensus which Hallin seems to be ‘those social objects not regarded by the journalists 
and most of the society as controversial’ (Hallin, 1986: 116). Relating this to general 
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discourse, we will treat the sphere of consensus as ‘the sphere where a culture’s main 
values reside’ (McGrail, 2008: 70). Next, there is the sphere of legitimate controversy 
which is the main arena in which media and politicians discuss controversial issues that 
are ‘recognized as such by the major established actors of the American political process’ 
(Hallin, 1986: 116). Beyond that lies the sphere of deviance which consists of voices 
‘which journalists and the political mainstream of the society reject as unworthy of being 
heard’ (Hallin, 1986: 116).  
Arguably, Hallin’s spheres do not concern themselves with the analysis of identity, 
how it is being created, how it is maintained, or how it is changed. Rather, they construct 
a rudimentary framework for how societal discourse is usually built up, from the values 
upon which everyone can agree to those that are highly disputed. In The Uncensored War, 
Hallin used these three spheres as a way to present his data on journalism during the 
Vietnam War; in essence, he conducted content analysis of various newspapers, 
categorised the assembled articles among topical lines, and plotted them across a positive-
neutral-negative spectrum.  
From this he was able to draw several conclusions; those categories in which most 
articles were situated must by default be in the sphere of legitimate controversy. Topics 
that are part of the sphere of consensus need not be debated as they are taken for granted, 
whereas topics that are part of the sphere of deviance are shunned and banned from 
mainstream political discourse. Still, the framework allows for an assessment of which 
discourses and disputes are the most contested with regard to their dominance. Through 
the juxtaposition of what is being contested and what is not we can deduce which topics 
are the pillars of Estonian self-understanding and which are out-of-bounds. As Olick 
suggests, the discourse that establishes itself as the dominant one creates the normalcy 
which ‘is as much an endogenous feature of collectivities as it is an external standard’ 
which we can thus assess (Olick, 1998: 382).  
Furthermore, it is logical that politicians, due to their desire to garner popular 
support, will have to conduct themselves in accordance with the rules of discourse that 
are acceptable to the population or otherwise have their remarks rejected by the audience. 
Communication within the context of politics is thus ‘based upon a set of conventions, 
which are observed by both discourse partners if they want to orient their interaction 
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towards a face-saving discourse’ (Grillo, 2005: 90). Traditionally, this is particularly the 
case when the topic of discourse is about a certain minority, be it religious, ethnic, sexual, 
or social (Grillo, 2005: 91).  
Originally, Hallin’s spheres were exclusively created as a leitmotif for how 
traditional media outlets construct discourse. Hallin explicitly views journalists as the 
gatekeepers and middlemen of discourse, who mediate conflict and exclude unnecessarily 
cruel and undesirable groups of society from the discourse. In his opinion, the media is 
supposed to show awareness of occasions that require no discussion, for example ‘the 
journalist does not seek opposing points of view on a firefighter risking his life to save an 
infant from a burning house (McGrail, 2008: 70). At the same time, the media must also 
serve as the defender of the outer boundaries of valid political discourse and thus has a 
distinct interest in maintaining the border between what can be said and what can’t be 
said because it is inacceptable (Hallin, 1986: 117). He thereby implies that the journalist, 
being the third party, is required to make communication between two parties reliable, 
understandable, and ‘civilised’, to decide what can be taken for granted and what must be 
rejected. The third research question, stipulated both in the introduction and the following 
chapter, aims to take out the middleman and see whether communication between the two 
original parties, the politicians and society, is feasible or not.   
Hallin’s spheres are also constructed to most appropriately mirror a society which 
has past experience with a certain topic. In its original conception, the Vietnam War was 
the reference topic and, arguably, sacrificing and fighting for their own freedom or the 
freedom of others had been part of American conscience and patriotism for a long time. 
Thus, an insult to a war veteran would automatically be rejected by society. Estonia, on 
the other hand, had never had any noteworthy interaction with immigrants with the 
exception of forced migration under Soviet occupation which is an entirely separate topic. 
Thus, the question presents itself whether Hallin’s spheres can persist in an environment 
in which there may be no rules with regards to what can and can’t be said.  
We have established that content analysis can be a helpful approach when 
employed with the right tools at hand. Hallin’s spheres offer us a vantage point from 
which we can, while acknowledging blurred boundaries, distinguish between different 
types of values that may or may not be worth discussing in a given society. Following the 
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content analysis, on which this thesis will elaborate in the third chapter, we will be able 
to deduce, both from the topics that were discussed and from the ones that were not, how 
the Estonian political parties treat the topic of the European refugee crisis and whether 
Hallin’s spheres still apply in this new media framework.  
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CHAPTER II. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The topic choice for this thesis emerged during the author’s first months of living in 
Estonia, while the various European countries were just starting to realise the scale of the 
challenge which the refugee crisis posed. This chapter contains elaborations on the 
research questions, a discussion on whether press releases constitute as a separate genre, 
an overlook over the selected empirical data, and an explanation with regards to the 
quantitative content analysis and qualitative discourse analysis methods employed in this 
thesis. 
 
2.1 Research Questions 
The research puzzle is deeply entrenched in the thesis title, namely ‘Political 
Communication Through Party Channels: A Content Analysis of Estonian Political 
Parties’ Communication During the European Refugee Crisis 2015 – 2016’. This thesis 
seeks to shed light on why the Estonian parties behave the way they do and whether the 
resulting type of discourse can be subsumed in Hallin’s spheres, an old framework that 
could be brought to new life. In order to solve this puzzle, there are three questions which 
need to be addressed in order to come to a meaningful conclusion. 
1. How do the different parties frame the refugee debate within their press releases 
regarding across the two platforms and how do they differ in terms of 
argumentation, rhetorical instruments, and prioritisation over other topics? 
This question lays the foundation for the reader to understand what the different parties’ 
positions were at the start and how they have since developed. As part of the methodology 
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this thesis will dissect differences in attitude towards refugees, argumentation style, the 
choice of platform, and the topic which the parties tie to the refugee crisis.  
2. How do real-life events related to the refugee debate affect discourse in Estonia? 
The second question concerns itself with the relationship that Estonian parties have with 
the different layers of the outside world – local, regional, national, and international – and 
whether they are more or less responsive to different types of events. In this part of the 
thesis, all questions related to real life events and their causal connections to political 
parties’ behaviour will be disseminated.  These questions will be answered through 
thorough coding, categorisation, and examination of the press releases and opinion pieces 
from various webpages and newspapers.  
3. Does the discourse constitute a deviation from Hallin’s spheres and, if so, how 
can this deviation be explained? 
This question will be answered mostly with the help of Critical Discourse Analysis which 
will be employed to go through seven opinion pieces by different politicians and 
intellectuals. As was explained in Chapter I, the nature of the discourse – what is one 
allowed to say and what not? – helps us deduce where Hallin’s spheres are situated in 
Estonian discourse. Finding the core that everyone can agree upon further implies what 
cannot be said, thus constituting the line to the sphere of deviance.  
 
 
2.2 Press Releases as a Separate Genre 
 
Over the past four pages we have established that there are a number of ways in which 
information can be, intentionally or unintentionally, distorted by the political actor, 
misrepresented by the media, or misunderstood by the audience. It has also been made 
clear that it is very hard for political scientists to calculate the reasons for each 
misunderstanding because of a grave lack of information and transparency within 
political parties, particularly within their elite circles, as well as the lack of resources to 
analyse which members of the audience misunderstood what part of the politician’s 
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message for what reason. The only way of eliminating at least a few of these sources of 
misunderstanding is thus to exclude the various media outlets and their editorial boards 
from the chain of information. With this, we experience a significant drop in the number 
of sources we can use, but at least those are edited and published by the respective party, 
thereby ensuring that speeches and opinions are not unjustifiably cut into soundbites and 
ten-second clips. At this point, some political scientists rightly ask the question whether 
press releases should be regarded as a media genre in its own right.  
Critics of this suggestion put forward that ‘the raison d’être of the Press Release 
is to be retold (…) as accurately as possible, preferably even verbatim, in news reporting’ 
and that it is thus not a separate entity with its own style and merits (Jacobs, 1999: xi). 
Furthermore, it is pointed out that press releases tend to be lengthier than journalists 
appreciate and thus have to be revised quite heavily in order to be featured in the news, 
be it on television or in print (Walters et al., 1994). Whilst both of these points are 
certainly true, they speak more in favour of regarding press releases as a separate media 
genre than Jacobs and Walters et al. would like to admit. The sole purpose of the press 
release, indeed, used to be a direct link to journalists with the hope that they would report 
on it as much as possible, if possible in its original form. Especially through the spread 
of the internet, however, the media landscape is now greatly diversified; both Facebook 
pages and dedicated webpages of political parties can attract thousands of followers and 
channel original statements without any interference straight to the target audience. The 
interaction with the media certainly still exists, however parties are no longer as 
dependent on them for the publishing of press releases as they used to be. Furthermore, 
the impact of confirmation bias is completely omitted in the argumentation of Jacobs; it 
is very natural for most citizens to follow those media channels, be they on television or 
in print, which reinforce their views rather than challenge them (Wittkopf & Jones, 2008: 
311).  
This means that people who strongly identify with right-wing values will likely 
avoid left-wing media and vice versa; more succinctly, even if a right-wing citizen were 
to read a centrist newspaper, there is the obvious possibility that they would likely avoid 
articles about left-wing parties unless they are being portrayed in a negative light. The 
second argument, put forward by Walters et al. supports the legitimacy of press release 
as an independent media genre even further; if press releases were only made for 
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journalists to dissect, then this would indeed make press releases just another part of 
journalism and regular media coverage, but now the political parties are in a much more 
comfortable position in which they can produce both soundbites for the traditional media 
outlets and longer opinion pieces for their own targeted audiences, perhaps elaborating 
and offering context to the soundbites that initially garnered attention.   
Moreover, parties can choose to what extent they want to rely on external coverage 
and for what purpose it should be generated; this means that press releases have 
emancipated themselves from being an inconvenient plague for journalists to acting as a 
party-controlled source of information which, for better or for worse, directly reaches its 
desired audience. Press releases can by no means replace media coverage because of the 
much wider circulation of the different media outlets, but they can now be read by the 
interested audience without any filters or unwanted intervention. 
 
 
2.3 Empirical Data 
 
Before German Chancellor Angela Merkel put forward the motion to create an EU-wide 
burden-sharing mechanism, there was virtually no discussion of the refugee crisis, neither 
between political parties nor as part of public discourse in general. Thus, the empirical 
data with which this thesis concerns itself spans from April 2015 until March 2016.  
Within this time frame, there were many occurrences both inside Estonia and 
abroad. First and foremost, the events which act as markers where the political attitude or 
line of argument might shift, emerged inductively. Upon the first thorough sighting of the 
sources, the author of this thesis compiled a list of events that were generally regarded as 
meaningful either abroad or in Estonia, both by politicians and media outlets. For example, 
the two most prominent refugee debate-related events in Estonia were arguably the 
torching of the Vao Pagulaskeskus, Estonia’s only accommodation centre for asylum 
seekers, on 3 September 2015 as well as the assembly of the Odini Sõdalased, the 
Estonian arm of the originally Finnish Soldiers of Odin, in February 2016. Outside of 
Estonia, the events that received noteworthy press coverage are the EU-wide quota debate 
19 
 
that went from April until June 2015, the death of Aylan Kurdi, a three year old refugee 
child who drowned in the Mediterranean Sea on 4 September 2015, the terrorist attacks 
in Paris on 13 November 2015, and the Brussels bombings on 22 March 2016. The 
distribution of these events over the various months will give us the opportunity to dissect 
whether different events had any effects on the frequency, tone, or arguments in the 
various parties‘ press releases.  
There are two main sources of empirical data that will be used within this thesis. 
First, we will use files sourced from the archives of the various parties represented in the 
Estonian Riigikogu amounting to around 600,000 words. The parties’ webpages constitute 
the ‘ideal platform’ because they are fully under party control; in this realm, the parties 
are the sole agenda and discourse setters in this environment and they can thus speak 
rather openly about any topic. In total, 135 posts from party webpages and 46 posts from 
the Riigikogu webpage, all of which were published between April 2015 and March 2016, 
were chosen for this research. 
The environment serves as a type of open laboratory where opinion pieces, 
discussions, press releases, and invitations for interaction between politicians and the 
public are shared. For this research, we will take into account everything that is posted on 
the website regardless of classification in order to display the as much of the discourse 
within the different parties as is possible for an outsider. When we speak of outsiders, 
however, we need to note that these outsiders are assumed to be few in number, 
representing only a fraction of the population; the party webpages are usually only 
frequented by those who are interested in the party while most of the public excludes 
itself as an audience for lack of interest and time.  
Corresponding with this assumption, the estimated website traffic for the Estonian 
parties is comparably low: the Conservative People’s Party’s webpage has an estimated 
35 visits and 57 page views per day (2Compete, 2016a); the Pro Patria and Res Publica 
Union’s webpage has an estimated 28 visits and 50 page views per day (2Compete, 
2016b); the Centre Party’s webpage has an estimated 74 visits and 171 page views per 
day (2Compete, 2016c); the Reform Party’s webpage has an estimated 56 visits and 336 
page views per day (2Compete, 2016d); the Social Democratic Party’s webpage has an 
estimated 33 visits and 43 page views per day (2Compete, 2016e); and, finally, the Free 
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Party’s webpage has an estimated 27 visits and 79 page views per day (2Compete, 2016f). 
Even when taking into account that Estonia’s population is comparably small at 1.3 
million, this is a rather low number of daily visits. We also need to bear in mind that 
oftentimes it will be content editors and politicians of the respective parties as well as 
journalists checking the webpages for their latest press releases. It has to be borne in mind 
that these numbers can only give an indication of the daily traffic and that it is not possible 
to determine how much of the traffic comes from the general public.  
Nonetheless, as it has been justified in the theory section (particularly Chapter 1.2 
and 1.3), what matters is the nature of these outlets. Analysing how the different parties 
handle their own communication channels can give us a direct insight into how the 
respective parties deal without the media as the middleman.  
Second, we will draw upon the archives of the press releases via the webpage of 
the Riigikogu. This webpage is no longer ‘party territory’ and offers us a direct insight 
into how much more or less frequently the different parties use the more public channels 
for communication and whether there is any restraint in terms of content publications. It 
is important to note that this is a proper comparative case because it is still up to the 
individual parties to decide what they want to publish and what they want to withhold – 
the crucial difference is the potential audience and thus our research could reveal a 
difference in behaviour. The Riigikogu webpage does not only host press releases and 
general political news, but also offers sections informing its visitors about the 
parliament’s history and current committee meeting schedules.  
The press release and news section is the most sophisticated part of the webpage 
with a proprietary search engine and many search criteria that one can enable. The 
webpage of the parliament experiences far greater daily traffic with an estimated 1,155 
visits and 3,235 page views per day (2Compete, 2016g). It can be assumed that the parties’ 
communications officers will be fully aware of the fact that a press release published on 
the Riigikogu webpage will reach a significantly larger audience than one that is merely 
published on the party webpage – with all the good and bad consequences. 
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2.4 Quantitative Content Analysis 
 
Content analysis is very much a positivistic approach by definition because it is based on 
the assumption that the knowledge is ‘out there’ waiting for researchers to be grasped and 
categorised, much like in the natural sciences. It also incorporates the norm of non-
reactiveness which means that it only allows the researcher to use data that is already ‘out 
there’; all sources that are used in this thesis were readily accessible without interference 
of the author and the research is thus non-reactive. This raises the necessity for us to 
distinguish between idealism and empiricism and elaborate on their respective merits. 
While proponents of idealism argue that thoughts and interpretations lie at the foundation 
of everything we call knowledge, empiricists contend that observation and validation of 
other observers, thereby ensuring that the experiment is reproducible, offer us objective 
and verified knowledge (Creswell, 2003). Formulating it more succinctly, quantitative 
content analysis concerns itself with the ‘systematic assignment of communication 
content to categories according to rules, and the analysis of relationships involving those 
categories using statistical methods’ (Riffe et al., 2014: 3).  
As was outlined in the theory section, McNair’s understanding of political 
communication initially included three agents that were all interconnected. In this original 
setting, his model is very much compatible with Lasswell’s model of mass 
communication which poses the question ‘who says what to whom and with what effect’ 
(Lasswell, 1948: 37). The model can be divided into five different steps, of which three 
will be covered throughout this thesis; first, control analysis asks who is the 
communicator; second, content analysis asks what message the communicator is forming; 
third, media analysis asks via which medium the communicator sends the message; fourth, 
audience analysis asks to which audience the communicator sends the message; and, 
finally, effects analysis asks which effects this process ultimately has. These five steps 
will be elaborated upon in the following paragraphs and, as we will discover, the first 
three of these steps also clarify the operationalisation of our data. Indeed, the steps four 
and five are irrelevant to this thesis because they concern themselves with the recipient 
and the interpretation of what happens during the transmission of the message. In this part 
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of the thesis, we will focus entirely on the agents that send the message, how they send it, 
and what the message contains.  
 
 
2.5 Operationalisation of Data and Quantification Table 
 
In order to properly understand how we seek to examine the collected data, we 
need to operationalise our five dimensions: Time, party, actor, attitude, and topic. Time 
is codified in months, ranging from April 2015 until March 2016. This offers us exactly 
one year for the assessment of how the refugee debate develops in Estonia. The second 
dimension of our operationalisation is the actor – for the mode of content analysis 
employed in this thesis we classify the party elite as the communicator rather than a 
particular person because all content that is being published both on the parties’ webpages 
and on the Riigikogu webpage is supposed to be in the respective party’s interest. A mere 
promotion of the values of an individual candidate would most likely be posted either on 
a personal blog or through opinion pieces in newspapers in which the politician in 
question can use their charisma and popularity to further their own agenda. Because ‘party 
elites have a vastly more constrained and stable set of political preferences’ (Jennings, 
1992: 419) we might expect the messages on both the parties’ webpages and the Riigikogu 
webpage to be more toned down than in newspapers’ opinion pieces although they are 
written by members of the same parties. In terms of operationalisation, we thus have two 
dimensions reserved of our analysis is thus ‘communicator’, namely (1) which party is 
making the press release (2) whether it is the entire party or a particular person who makes 
that statement. Either way, it is understood that it is the party elite that decides to publish 
the article in question on the party webpage, the Riigikogu webpage, or both. We take 
into consideration only the elites of parties which are currently represented in the Estonian 
parliament, namely the Estonian Central Party (Eesti Keskerakond), the Conservative 
People’s Party of Estonia (Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond – EKRE), the Estonian 
Reform Party (Eesti Reformierakond), the Estonian Free Party (Eesti Vabaerakond), the 
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Pro Patria and Res Publica Union (Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit - IRL), and the Estonian 
Social Democratic Party (Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond - SDE).  
Another distinction that is important for one of the research questions is that of 
the ‘agent’. There are two options; the first option, ‘press release’ is a closed variable in 
the sense that it can only mean that the respective party is regarded as both the author and 
the publisher of the post; the second option is ‘individual politician’ and it is an open 
variable in the sense that it does not refer to one single politician across all sources, but 
rather ‘any single politician within the respective parties’. This is to ensure that, in the 
chapter on the analysis of empirical data, we will be able to distinguish between different 
vocal politicians within one party as well as press releases rather than just have a graph 
telling us in what ratio parties post press releases and individual politicians’ posts. 
Ultimately, this measure was undertaken to facilitate observing the possible importance 
of personalised politics in Estonia. 
One of the more ambiguous steps of content analysis is to categorise the messages 
expressed by the communicators. This third and fourth operationalisation variables 
concern themselves with the categorisation of attitude and argument. Attitude describes 
the actor’s general stance not towards refugees per se but the refugee debate as a whole. 
There are three different attitudes in this dimension, namely ‘positive’, ‘negative’, and 
‘neutral’. A positive statement could, for example, be that ‘the government is doing its 
job satisfactorily’. In this instance, the communicator does not make a reference to how 
they view the issue of immigrants but how it is being dealt with in different aspects which 
would ultimately lead to an improvement of the treatment of refugees. A negative 
statement could be that ‘tolerance has gone too far in this country’. Again, there is no 
direct reference to the refugee debate but rather an evaluation of the situation at hand.  
Both positive and negative statements, however, are still evaluations and thus 
represent the subjective assessments of the different parties. A neutral statement could be 
a comment on legal procedures for immigration into Estonia without any evaluation or 
opinion attached to it. Another example for a neutral statement would be an expression 
of condolences regarding the Paris bombings without making any reference to refugees 
in a positive or negative manner. The distinction between general positivity, negativity, 
and neutrality will thus serve as the second operationalisation variable.  
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The third operationalisation variable used in this thesis is ‘style’. The three 
different options for this variable are ‘Emotions’, ‘Facts’, and ‘Inaccessible’. As was 
argued in the theory section, distinguishing between different ways of argumentation says 
a lot about both how a party portrays itself – appealing to values, logic, reason, or 
emotions – and how it wants its messages to be perceived by the audience. This explicitly 
excludes the question of how the audience perceives the statements because it is very 
difficult to properly trace what kind of influence a party statement may have on the 
audience and how it is being perceived. The classification ‘Inaccessible’ is used solely 
for the early postings on the EKRE webpage of which one can only read the first two 
sentences.  
This relatively loose definition of what constitutes a ‘Positive’, ‘Negative’, or 
‘Neutral’ comment provides us with a great deal of flexibility in terms of the categories 
for the fourth operationalisation variable: ‘topic’.  For the purpose of this research, there 
will be seven different categories on which the article in question is based; ‘European 
Union’, ‘Government’, ‘Economy’, ‘Culture’, ‘Security’, ‘Liberalism’, and ‘Multiple’. In 
the following paragraphs the seven different categories will be explained with 
comparative politics-related annotations as well as examples of search words. The 
different categories arose during the thorough sighting of all sources present in this 
quantitative content analysis. Said categories emerged because they describe all concerns 
brought up by the different politicians and parties in the pool of sources. As such, the 
following paragraphs describing the various categories were inductively created by the 
author and do not follow a set pattern taken from other sources.   
 European Union-related articles concern themselves with the role and impact of 
European Union policies or politicians. Search words for EU-related articles could range 
from ‘Euroopa Liit’ (European Union) over ‘Juncker’ (the President of the European 
Commission) to ‘kvoot’ (quota). While the connection to the EU is fairly obvious for the 
first two terms, the third one is rather subtle but no less important; when Estonian parties 
talk about the quota they directly refer to the quota which would redistribute 160,000 
refugees already in European Union member states. This quota was debated in the EU’s 
institution over the summer of 2015 and sparked a great number of reactions across 
Europe. In this sense, it is important to recall Durkheim’s main realisation that ‘we all use 
the same words without giving them the same meanings’ and that the researcher thus has 
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to ‘go beyond fleeting representations he owes to sense experience and in the end to 
conceive a whole world of stable ideals, the common ground of intelligences’ (Durkheim, 
1995: 437). Whilst it may be criticised that this could be seen as a deviation from a truly 
empirical data selection process, it must be argued that, in fact, many articles that are 
crucial to the debate would be ignored if we were only looking for articles that make 
direct references to the European Union. It is precisely this expansion in search terms that 
sheds light on the various modes of speech with which different parties communicate 
their opinions to the audience.  
 Government-related articles deal with references to the government of Estonia 
which is currently formed by a coalition of the Reform Party, the Pro Patria and Res 
Publica Union, and the Social Democratic Party. Indicators of a government-related 
article are search terms like ‘valitsus’ (government), words for individual government 
positions such as ‘peaminister’ (Prime Minister), or names such as ‘Rõivas‘ (the surname 
of Taavi Rõivas, the current Estonian Prime Minister). Some party politicans are 
éminences grises who are very influential within their party but largely unknown to the 
public, there are also party orchestration politicians who have a lot of public name 
recognition but little power within the party, and finally there are personalised leaders 
who enjoy substantial public support and exercise power within the party because of how 
crucial they are to the party’s attractiveness in elections – a prime example would be 
Edgar Savisaar (Blondel, 2010). As a result, parties at times resort to personalised press 
releases which criticise a particularly important or popular politician in order to 
destabilise said politician’s public standing. It is thus imperative for us to include names 
in particular because the personalisation of politics plays a powerful role. As a final part 
of this section, there are also specific demands that the government has either fulfilled or 
failed to fulfil, for example the demand for a referendum – thus, words like ‘rahvahääletus’ 
(referendum) and ‘mandaat’ (mandate) are also included in the list of search words for 
government-related articles.  
 Economy-related articles refer to the economic situation of Estonia and how a 
certain event or decision could positively or negatively affect that situation. As an 
example, terms such as ‘majandus’ (economy) or ‘majanduslik’ (economical) are words 
clearly connected to the economy. There are, however, also other topical words that are 
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used frequently such as ‘eelarve’ (budget) which could be used to refer to refugees that 
either improve the economy or are a drain on the economy.   
 Culture-related articles span a very wide spectrum of things that concern society 
or groups within society - everything which ‘includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, 
custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society’ 
(Tylor, 1974: 1). For the purpose of this research, most articles describe customary and 
moral-related instances such as the compatibility or incompatibility of certain ‘Estonian 
values’ with ‘Muslim values’, but there are also references to religion. Immediately 
related keywords are ‘väärtused’ (values) and ‘kultuur’ (culture), others are more distant 
such as ‘kristlik’ (Christian) and also terms that concern themselves with the plainly 
biological necessities for culture to survive, for example ‘vananemine’ (aging of society) 
and ‘lastetu’ (childless). 
 Security-related press releases concern themselves with a relatively narrow field 
of issues because of the nature of the discourse which we seek to analyse. The traditional 
understanding of security assumes that the international system is inherently anarchical 
and thus revolves around inter-state conflict with national industries and armies rushing 
to prepare and defend the country by military means (Waltz, 1979). The modern, multi-
faceted understanding of security helps us grasp the things that concern the Estonian 
parties regarding the refugee debate; it is not the security of the ‘state’ as an abstract as 
much as it is about ‘the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and 
societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against 
forces of change which they see as hostile’ (Buzan, 1991: 432). This understanding of 
security, admittedly, goes too far because with this concept large parts of the other topics, 
particularly economy and culture, would also be part of ‘what ought to be free from threat’. 
For this thesis, thus, we will employ a middle-grounds approach that emphasises on each 
individual’s physical inviolacy from wanton interference by other parties. This view of 
security allows us to take into account violence both from state actors, particularly 
military forces, as well as non-state actors such as terrorists or violent protesters. With 
regards to this research, key words are ‘julgeolek’ and ‘turvalisus’ (security) as well as 
‘terror’ and ‘ususõdalane’ (warrior of faith / religious warrior), thereby encompassing not 
just the tools to describe what concerns the parties – security – but also what they see as 
the threat to that security.  
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 Liberalism-related press releases are perhaps the most crucial because liberal 
values are the most obvious battleground in Estonian discourse. In the context of the 
refugee debate in Estonia, the liberal values which are the most strongly debated are those 
of tolerance towards foreigners as well as the international sense of solidarity, both in the 
humanitarian sense towards the refugees themselves, but also towards countries who 
struggle with the refugee influx and are pleading for burden-sharing in order to deal with 
the great numbers of refugees. The key words for this category are thus oriented towards 
those two values; for example, there are ‘solidaarsus’ (solidarity), and ‘inimlik’ (humane) 
as examples of what liberals would expect the treatment of refugees to be like, and on the 
other side of the debate there are terms such as ‘vihakõne’ (hate speech), ‘liberast’ 
(dysphemism for a liberal person) and ‘tolerast’ (dysphemism for a tolerant person). For 
the other words one would still have to ascertain the exact context in which they are being 
used. Especially in this category it can be seen very clearly why it is necessary to expand 
the traditional understanding of content analysis and the employment of basic and 
orthodox search words; similar to scholars who use discourse analysis, we must realise 
that ‘people of a given culture use language to reflect their attitudes toward the world in 
general and the life of their community in particular’ (Al-Zoubi Mohammad et al., 2007: 
231). Vernacular like ‘liberast’ is certainly crucial to understanding the nature of the 
debate beyond formalities and regular dictionary words and thus it needs to be included 
if we want to discover all appropriate sources for our research. 
Finally, some postings are labelled as Multiple in order to take into account the 
stark contrast between different parties’ press releases for our evaluation because 
otherwise there would be a very strong imbalance in assessment. Regarding the length of 
press releases on party webpages, the Centre Party‘s posts contain an average of 228 
words, the Conservative People’s Party’s press releases have an average length of 213 
words, the Reform Party’s posts have an average length of 684 words, the Free Party’s 
releases have an average length of 377 words, the Pro Patria and Res Publica Union’s 
press releases have an average length of 383 words, and the Social Democratic Party’s 
press releases have an average length of 251 words. If we also consider the median length 
of parties’ press releases, the word count grows further for some of the parties because 
some of the postings are short acknowledgements of events, for example regarding the 
attacks in Brussels, can obscure the notion that most press releases are around 300-400 
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words long. The label ‘Multiple’ is thus used in order to take the potential complexity of 
press releases with an unusually high word count into account. This labelling exists 
because it simplifies the coding process and evaluation while still accepting longer essays 
as a viable option for a party to publicise its policies. In the case of the 1,027 words long 
contribution by Urmas Paet which was posted on the webpage of the Reform Party, the 
author could have noted three categorisations, but attaching three labels was not an option 
because it would have given this posting the value of three postings by other parties 
(Reformierakond, 2015a). Rather, it is appropriate to acknowledge that some parties and 
individual politicians prefer to create a larger posting that ties several concerns into one 
holistic narrative. This concludes the explanation section for the different categories that 
are used for the third operationalisation variable, namely ‘topic’. 
To sum up, the quantification table which will help us classify the press releases 
has four variables that are plotted between April 2015 and March 2016. The first variable 
is ‘Party’ with the options ‘Estonian Central Party’ (Eesti Keskerakond), ‘Conservative 
People’s Party of Estonia’ (Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond – EKRE), ‘Estonian 
Reform Party’ (Eesti Reformierakond), ‘Estonian Free Party’ (Eesti Vabaerakond), ‘Pro 
Patria and Res Publica Union’ (Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit - IRL), and ’Estonian Social 
Democratic Party’ (Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond - SDE). The second variable is ‘Author’ 
with the two options ‘Party’ or ‘Individual’ – in the case of the latter, this thesis will also 
take note of and quantify individual politicians within the party to ascertain the ratio 
between party- and individual statements as well as the dominant figureheads of the 
respective parties. The third variable, ‘Attitude’ will utilise the aforementioned 
differentiation between a ‘Supportive’, ‘Critical’, and ‘Neutral’ stance. The fourth and 
final variable concerns itself with the topic that is most prevalently used in the respective 
press releases, and the different options are ‘European Union’, ‘Government’, ‘Economy’, 
‘Culture’, ‘Security’, ‘Liberalism’. These four variables will form the backbone of this 
thesis in order to ascertain whether the traditional boundaries of the Spheres of Discourse 
exist in the Estonian debate on the European refugee crisis and, if so, how they have 
developed over time.  
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2.6 Qualitative Discourse Analysis 
 
Qualitative Discourse Analysis has become increasingly important in social scientific 
research and arose in conjunction with other important theories, such as constructivism 
and securitisation theory, which also opposed the positivist stance which claims that 
reality is ‘out there’ to be discovered and instead suggested that every individual’s 
‘development is socially situated and knowledge is constructed through interaction with 
others’ (McKinley, 2015: 184). Indeed, social constructivism laid the foundation for 
linguistic constructivism regards language as a social practice, as an ‘intervention in the 
social and economic order, and one which in this case works by the reproduction of 
socially originating ideology’ (Caldas-Coulthard & Coulthard, 1996: 3). The current 
standard of linguistic constructivism is critical linguistics which has the explicit goal of 
‘changing or even removing the conditions of what is considered to be a false or distorted 
consciousness’ and rendering ‘transparent what had previously been hidden, and in doing 
so it initiates a process of self-reflection (…) designed to achieve a liberation from the 
domination of past constraints’ (Connerton, 1976: 20). 
It is indisputable that qualitative content analysis and critical discourse analysis 
are overlapping in their understanding and that ‘the actual procedures of analysis can be 
very similar’ (Hjelm, 2013: 878). Ultimately, this thesis will utilise critical discourse 
analysis which is defined as ‘having distance to the data, embedding the data in the social, 
taking a political stance explicitly, and focus on self-reflection as scholars doing research’ 
(Wodak, 2001: 9). What sets Critical Discourse Analysis apart from more traditional 
approaches is thus that it is not as much method-based as it is problem-based (Wodak & 
Chilton, 2005: 3). The key benefit of Critical Discourse Analysis for the second part of 
the thesis’s analysis part is that it allows the researcher to contextualise the situation at 
hand, and thus grasp implicit meanings and traits of social phenomena that would be 
untraceable for a more detached observer.  
Critical Discourse Analysis also discerns the ‘construction of the relationship 
between discourse participants (…) looking at the use of we, you, of relationally relevant 
vocabulary items and at assertions’ that one actor makes about the other (Fairclough, 
2003). However, it is not the contextualisation of the current situation that sets Critical 
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Discourse Analysis apart, but rather the quest to discover ‘how the socially produced 
ideas and objects that populate the world were created and are held in place’ (Herrera & 
Braumoeller, 2004: 19). Critical Discourse Analysis ultimately insists that there is a 
sedimented core to language, identity, and discourse respectively and that the respective 
cores are strongly, but not insurmountably, inert and can slowly change in the face of 
evolving patterns of interaction.  
While Critical Discourse Analysis serves as the general approach for our 
qualitative content analysis, it needs to be supplemented with several paradigms that help 
us establish the meaning and significance of the selected texts. For example, it is difficult 
to overstate the value of metaphors because the use of particular metaphors gives us an 
insight into what ideology and cultural background a particular actor has (Charteris-Black, 
2005: 97). Not only do metaphors tell us more about the actor but also about the audience 
because it is in any political actor’s best interest to tailor their message to the audience 
that they want to reach. The second important complementary paradigm is the world of 
verbal transgressions and insults; a verbal transgression in general carries ‘a source of 
energy so volatile that it demolishes some standard of propriety’ in a given discourse 
(Kertzer, 1994: 64). Insults in particular are ‘powerful because, in different ways and 
degrees, they violate linguistic, psychological and social decorum’ (ibid.: 65). For our 
Critical Discourse Analysis regarding the refugee debate in Estonia, insults will turn out 
to be one of the most important factors because they reveal the existence of binary 
structures in the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ thinking and thus also tell us more about the 
characteristics of the two (Stallybrass & White: 1986: 18). Furthermore, they can reveal 
strengths or weaknesses in our use of Hallin’s spheres in an environment where the 
journalist, as the middleman, who supposedly would be the gatekeeper of good public 
conduct, plays no role and the politician can optionally show self-restraint and -
censorship in his/her communication with the audience. 
As we have established, it is usually the media’s responsibility to hold politicians 
accountable by covering their transgressions, insults, and misconduct (Fogarty, 2008: 
463); in this thesis, however, we will exclusively conduct Critical Discourse Analysis on 
opinion pieces that the actors themselves submitted to media outlets.  
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2.7 Research Limitations 
 
A general problem with research that is interested in establishing causal links that are not 
mathematically provable is that the causal relationship can never be fully ascertained. Of 
course the research design takes greatest precautions to shield against that; seeing a spike 
in party post activity on a particular date could be coincidental and not related to the event 
that the researcher had in mind, so text and reference control can erase that risk. 
Nonetheless, it is important to remember that the best this research can do vis-à-vis this 
limitation is to elucidate the different strands of cause and effect and evaluate whether 
they are adequate or not. 
The second important limitation is a matter of temporality which is plainly due to 
the time constraints with which the researcher has to deal; Estonian discourse on refugees 
as well as, more broadly, the refugee crisis in Europe and the Middle East are ongoing 
situations which will continue to evolve over time, constantly changing with the 
emergence of new political actors and the occurrence of further crucial events. Until 
March 2016, Estonian refugee discourse was based almost entirely on other 
countries‘ experiences with the refugee crisis, seeing as the first seven refugees from Iraq, 
Syria, and Yemen only set foot in late March 2016; it is thus beyond doubt that the debate 
will take a few more turns over the next months as Estonian citizens start to interact with 
their new neighbours.  Nonetheless, offering an overview from the start of the Estonian 
discourse on refugees in April 2015 until March 2016 should be helpful for scholars who 
seek to conduct further research on the topic. What this thesis can offer, then, is the 
analysis of different parties‘ stances and the development of public opinion in order to 
lay the important groundwork for further research that will undoubtedly take place both 
within the realm of Estonian, Baltic, and Eastern European researcher communities.  
As discussed in the methodology section, this research relies on three types of 
sources for analysing discourse; press releases on party webpages, opinion pieces of 
leading political actors, and opinion polls. It should be conceded that they all come with 
different problems. The official party webpages vary drastically in quality; the 
Conservative People’s Party has a very detailled archive which, regrettably, only gives 
access to statements from 9 September 2015 until the present day whereas one can only 
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access the headlines without the full article of older articles; the archives of the Social 
Democratic Party were inaccessible due to technical failures and the author was only 
given the main refugee-related press releases upon e-mail enquiry; The archives of the 
Reform Party had faulty timestamps, which means that many files had to be put back into 
the order in which they were published. The opinion pieces of the most prominent 
Estonian political actors were hand-picked by the author in order to find the most explicit 
examples of how the actors illustrate their beliefs. This is done in order to display the use 
of metaphors, implications, and connections that the actors make to underline their 
position in favour of or in opposition to refugees; while all precautions have been taken 
to pick the most explicit examples of each political actor, it is possible that the author did 
not find the most suitable examples for some actors. Finally, it was difficult to find polls 
and surveys that had a high number of participants (n) and did not have implicatory or 
biased questions that would have an impact on the participants‘ responses.  
Another research limitation is the partial exclusion of the Russian minority in the 
different parts of analysis. Traditionally, the Centre Party is seen as a party that tries to 
garner the Russian vote and while its webpage is exclusively in Estonian, it could be said 
that the party statements at least take the Russian minority’s interests into account. The 
same cannot be said for the qualitative content analysis section because here the various 
actors express their personal opinions; the selected articles have all been published in 
Estonian-language newspapers and thus, to an extent, exclude the Russian minority from 
the discourse. This thesis does not take into account how many and which articles are also 
translated for and published in Russian-language newspapers in Estonia. 
Furthermore, the author is not a native Estonian and has a written comprehension 
level amounting to B2 in the Estonian language. Whilst this level is certainly sufficient 
to peruse and analyse the texts within the framework that is being used – finding word 
patterns and connections – it cannot be fully guaranteed that no translation or 
comprehension mistakes were made over the course of this research.  
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CHAPTER III – ANALYSIS OF EMPIRICAL DATA 
 
Having elaborated on the theoretical and methodological framework in the first two 
chapters, this part of the thesis will analyse the empirical data that has been selected.  
 
 
3.1 Results of Quantitative Content Analysis 
 
The first question that presents itself for our analysis is to what extent the parties 
use their webpages and parliament websites. As we can see in Figure 3, most parties use 
their own webpages more than their section on the parliament website, the only exception 
being the Centre Party which posted four and five times respectively. In general, we can 
see a clear bias for parties to use their own websites to communicate their ideas.   
 
Figure 3: Political parties and the total number of posts per platform 
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Particularly the Reform Party, the Pro Patria and Res Publica Union, the Social 
Democratic Party, and the Free Party use their own party pages disproportionately often, 
whereas with the Conservative People’s Party we can only see a 40% difference between 
the parliament and the party page. At the same time, it is worth noting that the 
Conservative People’s Party still has a much greater output with reference to the refugee 
crisis than all parties except for the Free Party. Throughout the next pages we will 
continue to map all sorts of differences between the parties, how they post, and with which 
topics the posts concern themselves.  
Comparing the Attitudes of the Different Parties 
 
Figure 4: Political parties and the attitudinal nature of their posts 
 
Leaving the differentiation between the two platforms behind us, it is first and 
foremost important to understand what the general attitude of parties towards refugees is. 
As was explained earlier in the methodology section, this thesis has three categories for 
the determination of attitude, namely ‘Negative’, ‘Neutral’, and ‘Positive’. As can be seen 
in Figure 4, the parties’ general stance towards refugees is sometimes unmistakeably clear 
and sometimes rather ambiguous. The graph combines posts on both party and parliament 
webpages because there was no distinguishable difference in the tendency towards a 
negative, neutral, or positive attitude towards refugees by any party between the two 
platforms.  
In different ways, all parties stand out in this comparison; the Conservative 
People’s Party has an almost exclusively negative attitude towards refugees regardless of 
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the topics which they connected to refugees; the Social Democratic Party and the Reform 
Party have, by a great margin, a positive attitude towards refugees; the Pro Patria and Res 
Publica Union as well as the Centre Party are more or less equally in favour, in opposition, 
and neutral; and finally, the Free Party has a quite pronounced share of both negative and 
positive posts, but a nonetheless strong majority of neutrality towards refugees.  
 Comparing the Style of the Different Parties 
 
 The degree to which politicians rely on emotionality or factual reasoning to share 
their arguments and garner support among the public cannot be underestimated. As it has 
been argued before, how politicians frame their arguments and opinions partially depends 
on the political culture; a society that rejects grandeur and prefers calm representatives 
may not be attracted to a populist party unless it shares its arguments in a language that 
large parts of society find more appealing. To recap the stipulations made in the 
methodology section, the difference in style between emotions and facts is not about who 
is right and who is wrong – even if it were possible. Rather, it is about how much the 
different parties feel the need to appeal to emotions or rationality in general.  
 
Figure 5: Political parties and the number of emotions- and fact-based arguments 
 
Of course, most politicians are fully aware of what their fellow citizens respond 
to the most, but perhaps there are also topics where, even in a rational society, emotions 
are preferred and vice versa. As can be disseminated in Figure 5, with the exception of 
the Pro Patria and Res Publica Union, there is a clear dominance of emotions over facts 
across all parties. Overall, a mere 16% of all posts made reference to facts and calculations, 
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whereas 80% related to emotions, speculation, fear, and hope in one way or another. The 
remaining 4% are the files that were found to be inaccessible on the Conservative 
People’s Party’s page.  
 
Comparing the Topics Used by the Different Parties 
 
 It is not unreasonable for any political scientist to hypothesise that different parties 
have different focuses; after all, one party may focus very much on green issues but lack 
a proper defence policy, whereas another could be dedicated to religious issues or 
nationalism without a clear vision for the economy. What is striking, however, is that the 
parties relate the refugee question to all different categories that were inductively selected 
for this thesis.  
 
 
Figure 6: Political parties and their references to the various topics 
 
As can be seen in Figure 6 above, all parties have at least one post touching upon 
multiple issues, and there is also a basic stock of references connecting refugees to the 
economy, culture, and liberal values. However, for each party there are also one or two 
topics that are particularly dear; most of the Conservative People’s Party’s posts concern 
themselves with the government and the EU, the same is true for the Pro Patria and Res 
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Publica Union; the Centre Party refers mostly to the EU and liberal values; the Reform 
Party, as pointed out earlier, mostly touches upon all topics within its rare posts; the Social 
Democratic Party has no topic that stands out; and, finally, the Free Party’s posts 
overwhelmingly often concern themselves with the Estonian government but also have a 
fairly high and even distribution across culture, liberal values, security, and combinations 
of the above. As for the previous figures, it is important to mention that there is no distinct 
difference between the prioritisation of topics on the party and parliament webpages.  
 
Comparing the Parties’ Use of Press Releases and Individual Politicians’ Posts 
 
 This section will utilise one graph per party in order to arrange a more easily 
discernible overview of how the different parties fill their webpages with press releases 
and individual politicians’ posts. Just like in the previous figures, the graphs show the 
combined results from the party and parliament webpages; again, there was no major 
difference or deviation in the two samples. Broadly speaking, the six parties fall into three 
categories in terms of the distribution between the two options:  
(1) Press releases are in the outright majority  
(2) One party figurehead posts the majority  
(3) All individual politicians combined severely outweigh the press releases 
These three categories seem very obvious but this is not necessarily the case; for example, 
there could also have been a scenario in which all parties have one figurehead that wants 
to strengthen his/her profile with regards to the refugee crisis. More surprisingly, there is 
no party in which the total number of individual politicians’ posts is roughly equal to the 
number of press releases.  
 
Figure 7: The Conservative People’s Party’s posts sorted by ‘agent’ 
0
10
20
30
40
50
Jaak Madison Mart Helme Martin Helme Press release Uno Kaskpeit
38 
 
The Conservative People’s Party, shown in Figure 7, is the only party that falls 
into the first category. Even though Martin and Mart Helme are quite popular, or at least 
well-known, figureheads of the party, the press releases represent just over 80% of all 
posts on the two outlets under direct EKRE control. There is also no recognisable trend 
among the few politicians that do publish, under their own name, on the webpages.  
Following this minor surprise, there are two parties that fall into the second 
category, albeit under vastly different circumstances. The first party, the Pro Patria and 
Res Publica Union, can be seen below in Figure 6, and shows quite a mixed picture indeed.  
 
 
Figure 8: The Pro Patria and Res Publica Union’s posts sorted by ‘agent’ 
 
 Whilst Margus Tsahkna certainly stands out as the most prominent individual 
politician, he only reaches eight posts out of a total of 23, whereas there are only three 
fewer press releases and ten posts by other individual politicians. The Pro Patria and Res 
Publica Union is a curious case because it has a discernible figurehead although, still, all 
other individual politicians combined overpower both him and the press releases, 
separately.  
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Figure 9: The Free Party’s posts sorted by ‘agent’ 
 
This previous, rather ambiguous case stands in stark contrast to the situation of the Free 
Party. As can be seen in Figure 9, Andres Herkel is the undisputed figurehead when it 
comes to posts about the refugee crisis although he only wrote just over a third of all posts. 
What matters in this case, however, is not the relative percentage of posts, but rather the 
total number: At a mere seven posts, press releases are rather scarcely found, and there is 
a veritable wealth of other politicians contributing so that there is no other individual 
coming remotely close to Herkel’s number. In the following chapter there will be a greater 
discussion as to what the curious case of the Free Party may mean.  
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 The third category has the Centre Party, Reform Party, and Social Democratic 
Party as its members. All three parties have very similar outlooks, with all individual 
politicians having roughly the same output. Furthermore, all individuals have either the 
same or a higher output than the general party under the label ‘press release’. It is worth 
adding that these three parties are also the least communicative ones in terms of the total 
number of posts, as we can see in Figure 11.  
 
Figure 11: Total number of party posts 
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Examining the Influence of Events and Comparing the Parties’ Responses Over Time 
 
So far this thesis has concerned itself exclusively with the first research question 
about how differently the parties act with regards to their choice of platform, general 
attitude towards refugees, argumentative style, choice of topics, and agent behaviour. 
This focus will now shift to the second research question: Do real-life events have any 
effect on the way the different parties communicate and, if so, what effects do they have? 
Occasional reference will be made to the full-page graph that shows the political parties 
and their number of combined posts and can be found in Appendix 1, as well as several 
graphs that are spread across the next few pages. 
Above all, this part of the thesis will make use of contextualisation in order for us 
to be able to causally connect a change in party behaviour with any events that have 
occurred. Figure 12 below shows the total number of posts per month with all parties and 
all media platforms combined. Without contextualisation, we would be left clueless as to 
what might have caused the spike of 39 postings in September and the sudden drop 
between November and December. For this matter, we will go through the various months 
one by one to disseminate from where the shifts may originate.  
 
Figure 12: Total number of posts per month 
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April 2015 – The Quiet Before the Storm 
The attentive reader will have noted that, in the methodology section, the thesis 
set out to start the content analysis from April 2015, yet all of the graphs only start with 
May 2015. With the best of intentions, this is not a design flaw but rather due to the 
relative inertia of political parties. Whilst the European Parliament had already passed the 
resolution regarding the refugee crisis on 23 April 2015, the Estonian translation only 
became available on 27 April 2015 (Euroopa Parlament, 2015). As a result, followers of 
international media were informed slightly earlier than people who relied on Estonian 
news. While Estonian newspapers took a few days to pick up on the refugee quota debate 
which now directly concerned Estonia, they easily outmatched the number of party 
reactions; neither the party webpages nor the Riigikogu webpage saw a single press 
release concerning the topic at hand. A potential reason for the slow reaction could be 
that all parties realised that this issue will play a major role in Estonian politics for the 
next few years and thus carefully constructed their policy in order to best cater to the 
demands of the respective electorates (Budge, 1994: 443).  This is particularly likely 
because all parties were equally fast to react to other events which we will cover in this 
thesis; parties usually responded on the day of specific events or, in the worst case, a day 
later.  
May 2015 – The Discussion Unfolds 
The political parties remained silent until the middle of May 2015, when the 
Conservative People’s Party published the first press release on 15 May. This month’s 
main debate regarding the refugee crisis revolved around the European Commission 
which published first calculations for the number of refugees that the different member 
states would have to accept. The quota would have meant that Estonia would have had to 
accept 738 refugees who had already arrived in Greece and Italy, and 326 further refugees 
who enjoyed international protection under the Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees (Postimees, 2015a).  
The initial reaction of the government was a complete rejection of any quota 
system; instead it proposed a focus on bilateral agreements for more effective burden-
sharing (Postimees, 2015b). As can be seen in Appendix 2, the European Union is by far 
the greatest target of the various parties; the Conservative People’s Party, the Free Party, 
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and the Centre Party all criticise the EU decision-makers because of the looming 
mandatory refugee quota. A second post by the Free Party criticised the economic 
hardship that would come with accepting any number of refugees and also warned that 
some refugees could be members of sleeper cells, be it voluntarily or through financial 
incentives. The only positive press release came from the webpage of the Reform Party 
and described the positive economic impact that refugees may have in the medium- and 
long term. Meanwhile, we cannot fail to notice the glaring absence of both the Pro Patria 
and Res Publica Union, being one of the government coalition parties since April 2015, 
and the Social Democratic Party, being another part of the government coalition since 
March 2014. 
The Riigikogu webpage shows a slightly different pattern with two posts from the 
Conservative People’s Party, one post from the Free Party, and one from the Centre Party. 
Three of these four articles are the same ones as those posted on the party webpages; the 
outlier here is the Conservative People’s Party’s post from 21 May. Beyond this, we see 
that neither of the three parties in government felt compelled to make a statement on 
behalf of their party’s faction in parliament. This may indicate general agreement with 
the party line. Finally, it is striking that all three government parties maintain complete 
silence on the webpage of the Estonian parliament. 
It is beyond doubt that May 2015 constitutes a very slow start for the Estonian 
parties in both media outlets over which they have editorial control. However, it is very 
remarkable that the topical distribution was very similar on the party webpages and the 
Riigikogu webpage – the EU was the number one topic with more than two thirds of the 
contributions respectively, and the other two topics that were being discussed, namely the 
economy and security concerns, were exactly the same. The European Union is the main 
focus of the discussion and there are two reasons for this state of affairs; first of all, two 
of the three most vocal parties, the Conservative People’s Party and the Centre Party, are 
relatively sceptical of the European Union as a whole; the Centre Party is organised in 
the conservative wing of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Party 
(ALDE) in the European Parliament, while one of the more popular figureheads of  the 
Conservative People’s Party, Jaak Madison, is the vice chairman of the European Union 
Affairs Committee of the Estonian parliament and thus makes some claims to expertise, 
however little they may be founded in reality.  
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Especially with the development over the next few months it is important to note 
now that the Free Party has positioned itself as critical of the decision-making process 
within the European Union. In effect, criticising the European Union was the only option 
for the opposition parties because, even without their partially Eurosceptic tendencies, 
the government was effectively on their side of the debate. The aim was thus to reach a 
narrative that would pit Estonia against the European Union in order for the opposition 
parties to at least seem as if they differentiated themselves from the norm. At this point, 
however, the combination of two factors makes it very hard to draw particularly 
meaningful conclusions from our May analysis; firstly, the very low output in press 
releases means a small sample size which could easily be completely different to that of 
the next few months without the impact of any events; secondly, even if we disregard the 
low output, we still need to consider that all parties continue to be in the phase of 
developing their policies regarding this topic and thus can’t be expected to keep their 
priorities the same way.  
June 2015 – A Shift Towards Discourse of Values? 
While the discussions in the previous months were mostly about facts and figures, 
the debate took a noticeably different shape in June. As the discussions in the various 
institutions of the European Union continued behind closed doors, discussions about the 
European Union dropped by roughly one third and gave way for a more equal distribution 
of attention to different topics. First of all, we see the emergence of articles making 
reference to multiple topics, secondly there is an increase in conversation about the 
government, culture, and liberal values. Throughout the entire month, however, there has 
been no reference to the economic impact that the refugees may have as well as a notable 
absence of security concerns.  
What is most important, however, is the notion that the refugee crisis got more 
public attention in general, as regular readers started contributing opinion pieces to 
newspapers (Postimees, 2015c). As is the case with many topics that suddenly spark 
public attention, political parties swiftly adjust and focus on creating opinion-shaping 
content on their respective webpages. This very much explains why there is a sudden 
jump from a total of 11 posts in May up to 20 posts in June. Meanwhile, as is shown in 
Appendix 3, the number of press releases on the Riigikogu webpage, remained precisely 
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the same at five posts. However, the content of the posts focuses much more strongly on 
government behaviour, thereby introducing a topical trend that we will continue to see 
over the next few months on both the Riigikogu webpage and the parties’ webpages.  
How can we explain that criticism formerly directed towards the European Union 
is now being towards decisions by the Estonian government? The main reason for this 
shift is the notion that the institutions of the European Union, particularly the European 
Commission, largely negotiated behind closed doors which meant that it was impossible 
for the opposition to criticise them. This meant, conversely, that the opposition parties 
could condemn the lack of communication between the government and the public; this 
is precisely what two of the three government related posts did. To cite an example of a 
combined topic article, the Conservative People’s Party managed to complain about the 
financial burden that the maintenance of the Vao refugee centre meant for the Estonian 
budget and tie it in with EU-related criticism for the lack of satisfactory financial support. 
Looking at the most frequently discussed issues, the relative decline of discourse 
about the European Union is the most obvious change from the previous month. It is also 
a significant symptom of the internalisation of the refugee debate, a process which will 
take place over the next few months as well. In this context, issue internalisation describes 
the process of a given society turning their scope from looking outwards to looking 
inwards. Many of the questions that the articles of this month raised tended to ask ‘can 
we handle this immigration?’ rather than ‘can they handle this immigration differently?’. 
As an example, the post published by the Free Party on 10 June asks about refugee-related 
questions like the potential financial burden and cultural implications such as language 
and culture courses. In June, the Conservative People’s Party focused its attention on the 
European Union, lack of government communication, and the supposed dominance of 
liberal values that hinder free public discourse. The Free Party, meanwhile, posted several 
long articles which were, at best, very diverse and, at worst, lacked direction; one article 
described government policies and argued in favour of displaying European solidarity, 
while another criticised the EU for the bad crisis management and the lack of economic 
support.  
To illustrate the disparity in press release output of this month, the Pro Patria and 
Res Publica Union, the Centre Party, the Reform Party, and the Social Democratic Party 
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have published six press releases – that is three fewer than the Conservative People’s 
Party alone. Beyond these numerical matters, the most important realisation is that June 
saw the initiation of the internalisation process, a trend that we will continue to witness 
over the next few months. 
July 2015 – Sunshine, Holidays, and Governmental Miscommunication 
July marks several milestones which we need to address over the next few 
paragraphs. The most obvious change that we can see is the strong increase of discussion 
about government behaviour; whilst in June government-related posts made up 25% of 
all press releases, this jumped up to more than 60% in July. The main reason for this steep 
rise is one lone party that fully dedicated itself to the cause of criticising government 
miscommunication: The Free Party. Out of the 13 posts that were released during July 
2015, 11 were made by the Free Party, eight of which were focused on governmental 
conduct and four of those specifically criticised the government for not communicating 
properly with the population. The Free Party’s three other government-related posts 
praised the government for nominating Marina Kaljurand as the new Minister for Foreign 
Affairs and restoring public confidence in the office1.  
In a rare display that we will only see one more time over the period of our 
research, the ruling Reform Party has published two relevant press releases which praise 
the government’s decisions regarding the refugee crisis in several ways, for example by 
contending that some of the refugees could teach Estonian children French, thereby 
contributing to Estonian cultural development, or suggesting that refugees may be able to 
open their own restaurants, thereby improving the quality of life in their environment as 
well as contributing to the economy (Reformierakond, 2015b). Meanwhile, we register 
complete silence on the webpages of four of the six parties with regards to the refugee 
crisis.  
Indeed, we can see that the picture is even more bleak on the webpage of the 
Estonian parliament where the Free Party is the only active faction in July. Of course, one 
                                                          
1 This previous drop in confidence came about because the previous Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Keit Pentus-Rosimannus, stepped down from office after she allegedly took 
money out of her father’s company to finance the construction of her new house, thereby 
contributing to the company’s bankruptcy (ERR, 2015b) 
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of the party’s three posts is about lack of government communication and another one 
praises the positive impact that refugees could have on Estonian society. Most 
importantly, however, the third one expresses relief over European Union decision-
making, namely the decision to scrap the previous quota for the distribution of refugees. 
The revised quota system, as agreed upon by the interior ministers of all EU member 
states on 20 June, altered the number of refugees that Estonia would have to accept down 
to 150-180 over the next two years (ERR, 2015c). However, there were no reactions on 
the Riigikogu webpage by any party apart from the Free Party.  
Taking into account that this fundamental event occurred, we need to ask 
ourselves the question what could possibly justify the relatively steep decrease in the 
number of press releases on the parties’ webpages, from 20 down to 13, and on the 
Riigikogu webpage, from five down to three. The answer is one that we could not have 
anticipated without any context: summer holidays. As the regulations stipulate, the spring 
session of the Riigikogu shall last until the third Thursday of June and the next fall session 
shall commence on the second Monday of September (Riigikogu, 2016). Thus, the 
Estonian parliament had already been out of session since 18 June and would remain so 
until 14 September 2015 and as a result we can expect a similarly low output in the 
following month. Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that this month still was no waste 
for our research because we slowly see how the Free Party’s understanding of the refugee 
debate, a mixture of communication, societal well-being, and the promotion of liberal 
values, emerges and solidifies. 
August 2015 – July Redux or a Change of Direction? 
The summer break continues and, shown in Appendix 4, party webpage press 
release output reaches one of its greatest lows, dropping from ten posts in July to nine in 
August. This time, the Free Party and the Pro Patria and Res Publica Union tie with three 
press releases each. In the Free Party’s camp, we see tendencies similar to those of the 
previous two months, specifically a two out of three focus on criticising government 
communication, but also a very long article in form of a tale which is also underlining the 
potential beauty of Estonia becoming a melting pot for different cultures (Vabaerakond, 
2015a). The great surprise of the summer, however, is the sudden reawakening of the Pro 
Patria and Res Publica Union which shared three articles throughout the month with, 
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generally, very refugee-positive connotations. The first article is shared by IREN, the 
women’s association of the Pro Patria and Res Publica Union, and is a stirring appeal in 
favour of liberal values, human empathy, and peaceful discourse (IRL, 2015a). What all 
three articles shared was a fundamentally positive sentiment in support of shared 
responsibility as well as some neutral remarks about how the refugee crisis affects other 
countries within the European Union and how they deal with that challenge.  
In the Riigikogu, the stream of communication almost ran dry as the number of 
press releases fell from three posts in July to only one in August. Surprisingly, this lone 
commentary was published by the Centre Party which had not voiced any refugee-related 
opinions on the Riigikogu webpage in more than two months. This post, however, was 
not a statement of the Centre Party’s policy objectives as much as it was a response to a 
comment made by Urmas Reitelmann, a specialist of the Estonian paramilitary forces 
(Kaitseliit). In this comment, Reitelmann made very derogatory and explicit remarks 
about refugees, such as that they are nothing but scum and human trash, and that Estonia 
already has 300,000 Russian parasites that should not have a place in Estonia (Õhtuleht, 
2015). In his commentary, one Centre Party politician asked the Estonian Defence 
Ministry to take action against these comments which he perceived as clear incitement to 
inter-ethnic hatred (Riigikogu, 2015). This was an important step because, although it is 
not a statement of policy suggestions, it meant that the Centre Party publicly embraced 
liberal values for the first time2.  
August was, overall, a rather uneventful month in terms of numbers but 
nonetheless two parties which were traditionally among the more silent parties voiced 
their opinions while others stood silence. At moments like these it should be pointed out 
that any party could have made a similar statement, discrediting racists and criticising 
illiberal stances. Maintaining a steady flow of information to journalists and the broader 
public help parties create a certain public image but also frame the debate according to 
their respective preferences. 
 
                                                          
2 The cynical observer may also, perhaps not wrongly,interpret this as a move to show 
solidarity with the ethnic Russian minority, a crucial voter demographic of the Centre 
Party.  
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September 2015 – The Fallout of the Arson of Vao Pagulaskeskus 
The most significant month of the period on which we conduct our research is 
September 2015. Although there are several reasons upon which we will elaborate in the 
following paragraphs, the immediate and obvious cause is the arson of the Vao refugee 
centre, Estonia’s only refugee centre that currently houses 51 asylum seekers and seven 
refugees with a residence permit from 17 different countries, most notably Ukraine, 
Armenia, Iraq, Albania, Dagestan, and Georgia (Valitsus, 2016a). The refugees that lived 
there at the time had no connection to the Syrian civil war or other civil strife in the 
Middle East and North Africa.  
With this core information, let us delve into the statistics. Following only ten posts 
on the party and parliament webpages in August, September marks the peak across the 
twelve months which we have analysed with a total number of 39 published articles. It is 
also important to point out that all statements were released on the day of the arson, on 3 
September, or after it. Effectively, this meant a premature breaking of the relative silence 
caused by the summer break between parliamentary sessions. Of the 39 posts, 15 were 
published by the Conservative People’s Party with a focus that might come as a surprise 
for many people; they key words that were the most frequently used for this month were 
‘quota’ and different variations of the word ‘sovereignty’, thereby mostly establishing a 
link to the European Union and criticising its supposedly failed refugee policies. Other 
points of criticism involved questions of security such as border control and also 
economic concerns about the previously mentioned ‘mugavuspagulased’, refugees 
exploiting the welfare state (EKRE, 2015).  
Similarly, the Pro Patria and Res Publica Union decided to refrain from discussing 
the perpetrators and instead contended in its two press releases that the European Union 
has engaged in a wide-spread disinformation campaign while simultaneously conducting 
‘jaanalinnupoliitika’, ostrich politics, thereby implying that the leaders of the European 
Union, much like the ostrich in the proverb, preferred to stick their heads in the sand 
rather than solve the problems at hand (IRL, 2015b).  The Free Party formed a diverse 
and balanced response over 19 press releases – the first four reactions, posted between 3 
September and 10 September, included praise of how the government handled the 
situation, criticism towards the EU, but also a renewed commitment to liberal values and 
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the responsibility to help those in need. Following this wave of verbal support, the Free 
Party went back to what it does best; excoriating the lack of information flow between 
the government and the general public. Members of the Free Party, while not establishing 
direct links, insinuated that better management of information channels could have 
prevented the arson of the refugee centre.  
The Social Democratic Party released one statement in which it confirmed its 
commitment to solidarity with friendly nations as well as universal human rights. The 
two most exceptional cases in this debate are the Reform Party and the Centre Party, albeit 
for completely different reasons. The Reform Party’s reaction was a mixture of describing 
regular positive government practices and defending the government’s policies regarding 
the refugee crisis in general, but also expressing support for what we have classified as 
liberal values in the methodology section. The exceptional trait of this post is that it is the 
only one that makes reference to Aylan Kurdi, the three-year-old Kurdish refugee who 
tried to cross the Mediterranean Sea, drowned in the process, and was washed ashore, 
causing headlines around the world.  
Meanwhile, the absence of Centre Party posts can be justified by the focus on a 
completely different topic, namely the corruption scandal surrounding Edgar Savisaar. 
Saving the honour, integrity, and reputation of their party leader thus became the most 
important objective for Centre Party officials3.  
 In the Riigikogu, the number of press releases was naturally smaller but still 
reached its peak across our observation period with a total of 10 posts. Out of these, six 
were posted by the Conservative People’s Party and most of them offered a broader 
collection of criticisms compared to the tone of the party’s press releases on their own 
webpage. The six posts covered an attack on liberal values, criticism directed at the 
European Union and the Estonian government alike, and also a reiteration of the financial 
burden that refugees would place on Estonia. The most noteworthy change is the use of 
                                                          
3 Savisaar, being the personalised leader of the party, was accused of playing a pivotal 
role in a big corruption scandal in which he abused his office, being the mayor of 
Tallinn, and accepted bribes in exchange for favourable real estate contracts, building 
without permit, and even influencing a procurement (Postimees, 2015d). 
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the word ‘liberast’, a very derogatory term describing a person with liberal values, in the 
party’s initial reaction to the arson of the refugee centre in Vao dating back to 9 September.  
The Free Party published the same three posts that were released on the party 
webpage on 3 September; again, they support the way the government is handling the 
situation and also underline the Free Party’s commitment to liberal values and the 
responsibility to help people in need. The Centre Party published a very short note of 
precisely 76 words on the Riigikogu webpage, explaining that a difference in opinion 
must under no circumstances lead to atrocities like arson or even attacks on people. 
Beyond that, the author was unable to find reactions from the remaining parties; the lack 
of a press statement by the Pro Patria and Res Publica Union, the Reform Party, and the 
Social Democratic Party is, however, most likely due to the fact that they have issued a 
joint government statement. 
In late September, there were two more events that sparked reactions by some of 
the parties which we need to mention. On 22 September, the interior ministers of the EU 
member states have finally agreed to the refugee redistribution plan, thereby contractually 
obliging Estonia the 150-180 refugees it had promised to take (BBC, 2015). The next day, 
on 23 September, the Estonian parliament passed the long-discussed amendment to the 
Aliens Act (‘Välismaalaste Seadus’) in which the new chapter 2 stipulates conditions for 
temporary stay in Estonia as well as short-term employment (Riigiteataja, 2015).  
Ultimately, there were several events in September that have led the various 
parties to develop into vastly different directions. Especially the posts on the party 
webpage of the Conservative People’s Party indicate an outward focus that engages the 
audience in a discourse between ‘us, the Estonians’ and ‘them, the European bureaucrats 
who try to spread their liberal propaganda’. The spreading metaphor was very appropriate 
for the legal changes towards the end of the month, where one piece of European Union 
legislation was quickly followed by the corresponding Estonian amendment to 
accommodate the changes.  
At the same time, the Reform Party most strongly displays liberal qualities in the 
sense that it, too, has an outward focus but not as much for the construction of the self but 
rather the maintenance of the self. Liberalism is often portrayed as a reasonable approach 
which is based on a certain admiration for existing structures as well as the universality 
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and omnipresence of the reasonable values that it promotes (Laden, 2001: 2). Apart from 
being the party in power, it is very likely this belief in universality and the feeling of 
responsibility that motivated the Reform Party to look outwards not in order to distinguish 
itself or Estonians from the rest, but in order to be a part of a European community whose 
members help each other in times of need.  
This is also revealed in the distribution of topics throughout September: out of a 
total of 39 topical emphases, 7 concerned themselves with the European Union and 
another 14 dealt with government performance, meaning that more than 50% of all 
references looked at either the European Union or the government as the actor that had to 
do something differently about the refugee crisis. The Free Party was shaken at the 
beginning of September and rallied behind the Reform Party as a sign of standing-together, 
but soon resumed its routine of criticising government communication. Finally, one has 
to question the Social Democratic Party and the Centre Party on their conduct which is, 
at this point, bordering on complete silence; whilst the former can point to the fact that it 
is part of the government coalition, the latter appears to be careful to not commit to a 
particularly strong position vis-à-vis the refugee crisis in order to maintain support by 
their core electorate, the Russian minority. 
October 2015 – Return to Old Form?  
The output of posts across both party platforms dropped from 39 to 27, which still 
is the second highest mark over the period with which we concern ourselves here. October 
was the first month where there was a relative calm on both the national and international 
stage and the parties were allowed to turn against each other in the quest for assertion and 
public recognition. As a result, we can immediately see the effects of this shift on how 
frequently the various discussion topics dominate the respective articles; after the 
temporary but nonetheless heavy focus on the EU and the Estonian government in 
September, the topics are spread much more widely again in October. Instead of two 
topics sharing more than 50% of the parties’ attention, we now have a much more even 
spread with the exception of government-related comments in 10 postings. Not only does 
the economic situation return from its relative absence from discourse back to old heights 
but it is also discussed by several parties, namely the Conservative People’s Party, the 
Free Party, and the Social Democratic Party.  
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Meanwhile, the two usual suspects, both the Conservative People’s Party and the 
Free Party criticise different behaviours of the government throughout October. Further, 
the Pro Patria and Res Publica Union appears to have recovered from its pro-liberal praise 
in August and is fully back in the culturally conservative realm. In its five posts it mostly 
worries about the survival of Estonian culture as it stands right now and also criticises the 
European Union.  The Reform Party falls back into silence and joins the ranks of the 
Centre Party which, for the fourth consecutive month, has not shared a single refugee 
debate-related press release on the party webpage. 
Just like on the party webpages we register only a small decrease in party activity 
on the Riigikogu webpage, going from 10 down to six contributions. Again, the 
Conservative People’s Party is the most active, posting four out of the seven press releases 
with an emphasis on government critique and economic references. Three out of these 
four posts are original to the Riigikogu webpage and cannot be found on the party 
webpage. The Pro Patria and Res Publica Union also shared a commentary putting 
forward the motion to increase the expectations that the state should have towards 
immigrants and their advancements in the Estonian language, demanding at least level 
B1 for improved social and cultural interaction (Riigikogu, 2015c).  
While the Free Party shared the usual criticism of flawed government 
communication, the big surprise of the month was the Social Democratic Party which 
posted its first refugee debate-related press release on the Riigikogu webpage. It was 
essentially a call for calm on both sides of the debates, remarking how both sides only 
call each other ‘tolerastid’, a derogatory term for a tolerant / liberal person, FSB agents, 
and ‘natsid’, Nazis. The second half of the commentary contained a plea for a 
metaphorical ceasefire for the refugee debate in Estonia in order to find answers for 
pressing topical questions; the commentary then asks six of these questions and ends 
without giving any answers to them (Riigikogu, 2015). At the same time, the Centre Party 
as well as the Reform Party remain completely mute on the discussion. 
The main conclusion that we can draw from our analysis of October is that an 
absence of drastic events both on the in- and the outside allow the parties to reach a degree 
of consolidation in how they discuss the refugee crisis and, if one wants to use this term 
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already, normalcy. Both the absolute number of press releases and the topical focuses and 
distributions within those press releases return to the realm of the familiar.  
November 2015 - Do Outside Events Equal Outside Attention? 
The November 2015 Paris attacks created an atmosphere of insecurity across the 
Western hemisphere including Estonia. Recalling the 7/7 London bombings and the 2004 
bombings in Madrid, terrorist attacks in Europe were by no means a new phenomenon. 
What changed the equation for many countries in Europe, particularly the traditionally 
more ethnically and religiously homogenous ones, was that the refugee quota meant that 
they either already had or would soon have Muslims living among them. Looking at the 
number of overall party releases, we see a slight drop from 27 in October to 21 in 
November.  
As we can also see in Appendix 2, in these 21 posts, the political parties focused 
a great deal, in fact more than 50% of all posts, of their attention on security-related 
matters. This is a radical development because, in the previous six months, security 
concerns had only been raised seven times in total across all parties and all media outlets 
at their disposal. This occurred across the party spectrum, indeed the Conservative 
People’s Party, Pro Patria and Res Publica Union, the Free Party, the Centre Party, and 
the Social Democratic Party all made references to the Paris attacks and the state of 
national security in Estonia; the main difference is that the Conservative People’s Party 
contended that Muslims in general can pose a threat to security whereas all the other 
parties suggested that these are isolated incidents that will not happen in Estonia.  
The attentive reader will no doubt have noticed that, again, the Reform Party did 
not feel incentivised to publish a statement, potentially because they deemed Prime 
Minister Rõivas’ speech sufficient. The remaining references were usually mentioned as 
side notes to the potential security risks, for example some parties pointed out that Muslim 
culture per se does not threaten or impose anything on Estonian society and should thus 
not be regarded as a threat to security.  
Activity on the Riigikogu webpage also died down slightly with a decrease in total 
contributions from six to five. The most notable occurrence is the absence of Free Party 
statements which single-handedly led to the decrease in total contributions. Conversely 
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to the developments on the party webpages, however, the spread of topics was completely 
different; while there was one post concerning itself exclusively with security matters, 
two other posts dealt with multiple issues and the other two had an economic perspective. 
What could explain the noticeable difference in topical distribution between the party and 
Riigikogu webpages? The most glaring difference is plainly the lack of activity of two of 
the parties, particularly the Reform Party which uses governmental communication 
channels to voice party statements.  
November presents us with a remarkable lesson; contrary to our first assumptions 
following the lack of reaction at the photos of Aylan Kurdi being washed up dead on the 
shore of the Mediterranean Sea, we can now confirm that international events influence 
Estonian discourse despite its geographical distance. The only previous international 
event of magnitude was the debate on the refugee quota which, while having its source 
outside of Estonia, has a direct influence on life in Estonia because once there would be 
an agreement, said refugees would come to Estonia with absolute certainty. The Paris 
attacks were more nuanced in the sense that the attack did not imply anything for any 
other country with absolute certainty; rather, it was up to the Estonian parties to fill in the 
gaps and either make or deny links between Islam, refugees, and threats of terrorism. 
December 2015 – Hibernation Part I 
With the advent of December, the frequency with which party posts were 
published slowed down just as much as political discourse as a whole. The autumn session 
of the Riigikogu ended on 17 December and the next spring session would resume on 14 
January. Throughout December, only six political statements were made linking the 
refugee crisis to the EU, the government, and liberal values. The Conservative People’s 
Party reported about an anti-EU demonstration in Haapsalu which was supported by the 
party, whereas the Reform Party published a partially very critical press release arguing 
that, while maintaining open borders as agreed upon in the Schengen Agreement, the 
European Union and Frontex in particular had failed in securing the EU’s outside borders.  
This is the only time that the Reform Party openly criticises the European Union 
or the effects that refugees could possibly have on Estonian society. It is also the final 
time that the Reform Party uses its party webpage channel to propagate their opinion 
regarding the refugee debate.  
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The sole refugee-related post on the Riigikogu webpage was published by the 
faction of the Conservative People’s Party, harshly lambasting liberal values and again 
using the word ‘liberast’ to attack liberally-minded people. Because of this low-point in 
press release output, this month shows a completely distorted 100% focus on liberal 
values and is thus not statistically relevant for our overall assessment of the topical 
distribution in the refugee debate. 
January 2016 – Hibernation Part II 
In terms of output of press releases, the beginning of the new year seemed very 
much like a continuation of the previous year. The only contribution on the parliament 
webpage was posted by the Conservative People’s Party and shared information about a 
petition, arguing that the government had failed to take popular opinion into account, 
forced multiculturalism on the Estonian people, and thus made it more likely for terrorist 
attacks or mass rapes – like in Cologne, Germany – to occur in Estonia as well (EKRE, 
2016a). We can see, thus, that the link that was established between events that occurred 
outside of Estonia on the one side and the situation in Estonia itself on the other has 
prevailed in the discourse of the Conservative People’s Party over the past few months. 
Furthermore, the Conservative People’s Party criticised the European Union for its 
inconsistency with the Dublin III Regulations and also promoting the view that, before 
Estonia can offer aid to anyone else, the state should first care for its Estonian citizens 
more properly. This remark is categorised as a reference to liberal values with a negative 
connotation for refugees because Jaak Madison, member of the Conservative People’s 
Party, openly stated that an Estonian’s life must be prioritised over other people’s lives. 
This attitude of ‘everyone fends for themselves’ goes directly against universality and 
equality.  
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Figure 13: Attitude towards refugees of all posts combined per month 
Nonetheless, January also brings some good news – as can be determined in 
Figure 13, January 2016 is the only month in our period of analysis in which the number 
of posts expressing a positive attitude towards refugees is greater than those expressing a 
negative or neutral view. This fact should, however, be enjoyed with some caution 
because it is merely three positive posts versus two neutral and negative ones respectively.  
February 2016 – The Advent of the Soldiers of Odin 
The Soldiers of Odin are an originally Finnish anti-immigrant group which started 
patrolling Finnish cities in late 2015. On 28 January 2016, the Estonian division of the 
Soldiers of Odin formed and planned on patrolling the streets of Estonian cities 
(Postimees, 2016). The first meetings took place in the middle of February and culminated 
in the participation of a parade together with many supporters of the Conservative 
People’s Party on Estonian Independence Day, 24 February (International Business 
Times, 2016).  
The magnitude of political reactions showed how seriously the various parties 
took the issue: Only 14 party press releases were posted in February, but half of them 
concerned themselves with the Soldiers of Odin. While the Social Democratic Party and 
the Free Party unequivocally declared their objection to the ideology and practices of the 
Soldiers of Odin, other voices were more cautious and restrained. The Centre Party 
attempted to walk the thin line between making clear that these almost paramilitary 
0
5
10
15
20
25
Negative
Neutral
Positive
58 
 
developments were unacceptable, and justifying that the discontent with the recent 
political developments were understandable and had to be channelled somehow. 
Unsurprisingly, the Conservative People’s Party interpreted the expansion of the Soldiers 
of Odin into Estonia as a positive development that arose out of the disenfranchisement 
of the Estonian people with the supposedly super-liberal and anti-Estonian policies of the 
government.  
As a side note, Prime Minister Rõivas responded to the situation at hand shortly 
after it arose and maintained that ‘self-proclaimed patrol gangs do not increase the 
Estonian people’s sense of security in any way, rather the opposite’ (Reuters, 2016). Apart 
from this situation that was ultimately defused, the Free Party posted several more press 
statements which embraced liberal values and the European Union as a whole while also 
criticising government communication.  
The debate in the Riigikogu went largely along the same lines; two of the four 
posts concerned themselves with the advent of the Soldiers of Odin and the sense of 
insecurity because of them, while the other two voiced governmental and societal 
criticisms. 
At this point in time, it seems like the Estonian political parties have discursively 
found some of the core values upon which they can agree. While the Conservative 
People’s Party, as opposed to all other parties, did not go so far as to fully embrace the 
Soldiers of Odin publicly, all parties explicitly or implicitly agreed on the sovereignty of 
the Estonian state and its monopoly with regards to the exertion of power.  
March 2016 – A Renewed Shift Towards Security? 
In the final month of our analysis, Estonian political parties reacted to another 
international event, namely the Brussels bombings on 22 March. The total number of 
posts published across all party channels went down from 14 to 13 and, more importantly, 
only a small number of them were posted after the Brussels bombings. The attacks on the 
Belgian capital were exploited exclusively by the Conservative People’s Party as part of 
the criticism they leveraged towards liberal values and the impact of Muslim immigration 
on Estonian culture. The remaining four press releases were very diverse in their focus; 
the Conservative People’s Party voiced concerns about the economic outlook, an article 
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published by the Free Party worried about security concerns in connection with EU 
policies two weeks prior to the Brussels bombings, and the Pro Patria and Res Publica 
Union appeared to have rediscovered its appreciation for liberal values and shared 
responsibility in two separate articles.  
The Riigikogu webpage shows almost the exact same picture; the Conservative 
People’s Party voiced its doubts about matters of security, the Pro Patria and Res Publica 
Union published one of the two articles that we also found on the party webpage, and the 
Free Party publishes the same critical article as on the party webpage in addition to an 
expression of condolences to the people of Brussels while maintaining that this attack 
does not alter the degree of safety and security in Estonia.  
There are two things that are particularly remarkable about our findings from 
March 2016; first, it is curious that the reaction to the Brussels bombings did not match 
or even excel the reaction to the Paris attacks, particularly when taking into consideration 
that March was the month when the first EU-quota refugees would arrive; second, the 
complete wordlessness of the three biggest parties in parliament both on their own 
webpages and on the Riigikogu webpage was truly confusing – no party would have lost 
a single vote by expressing condolences and reiterating already existing policy points.   
 
 
3.2 Results of Qualitative Discourse Analysis 
 
Insults and Derogatory Terms 
In chapter 2.6 of this thesis, reference was made to the importance of insults and other 
derogatory terms in order to determine how well Hallin’s spheres work without the 
journalist as the middleman. Of course, it would be no novelty for a media outlet to report 
on the transgression of a politician, but it is very unlikely that said outlet would quote the 
politician, thereby reiterating the insult; a practical example is the bleep censor in 
American television which masks profanities or severe insults. This rather short section 
of the thesis will concentrate on the question whether politicians and parties are willing 
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and able to refrain from using insensitive language although no one would hinder them 
to use it.  
On 27 March 2016, the Conservative People’s Party published a post wishing 
everyone happy Easter celebrations connected with a reference to ‘Maurid’ and 
‘Homoapologeetid’ (EKRE, 2016). The most direct translation in the English language 
would be the equally archaic and insulting ‘Moor’, describing black people, and 
‘homoapologists’, describing supporters of the civil partnership act and gay rights in an 
insulting fashion. What is perhaps just as important as the insults themselves is that this 
was posted on the party webpage in the name of the entire party. In this particular instance, 
the transgression appears to have been either fully intentional or completely unintentional 
and without any thought of wrongdoing.  
On 23 September 2015, the Conservative People’s Party posted another press 
release decrying the ‘Mugavuspagulased’ (EKRE, 2015). The closest translation into 
English would be ‘comfort refugee’. In some contexts, it can be a derogatory term 
describing Estonians who live abroad in wealthier countries. In this case, however, the 
press release warns economic refugees of using Estonia as a transit country en-route to 
Finland and Sweden, where the refugees would then exploit the social welfare system.  
On 18 September 2015, one of the Free Party’s members, Merle Jääger, wrote 
about an Estonian folklore character, the ‘Ahjualune’ (Vabaerakond, 2015b). In the 
folklore, the character keeps exploiting other protagonists and always finds another 
excuse to, among other things, take their food. Jääger writes in her article that now, hordes 
of ‘Ahjualused’ are arriving in Europe and something has to be done about this problem. 
This post was in part unexpected because it was posted by a Free Party member. 
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CHAPTER IV. DISCUSSIONS 
 
Following our analysis of the sources in the previous chapter, this part of the thesis 
contains discussions on the most prevalent questions that have arisen over the past sixty 
pages. The first of our three research questions enquired about how differently the parties 
communicate and construct their arguments.  
Commonalities of the Various Parties 
The first point that the parties share is the predominant reliance on emotions rather than 
fact-based argumentation. This is rather understandable for several reasons:  
(1) The European refugee crisis presented Estonia with a situation in which it had 
never found itself before, so there were no previous experiences upon which 
the political elite could have built; 
(2) The very phenomenon of non-white immigration is a new occurrence for 
Estonia and the only comparison that some compatriots can draw is that to the 
time under Soviet occupation which came with many hardships; 
(3) Immigration as a concept mostly touches upon values and emotions, 
particularly national sentiment and fear of the unknown; 
(4) Even those factors of immigration that could be dealt with on a factual basis 
are hard to calculate because estimations of, for example, future budget costs 
are dependent on many unknown variables; 
(5) There was little appetite in the population for fact-based arguments and most 
parties did not want to give the stage to the populists of the Conservative 
People’s Party, thus they had to appeal to the electorate’s emotions as well. 
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Beyond this, the different political parties share a preference for publishing posts 
on their own webpage rather than on the parliament webpage. One of the reasons for this 
situation is likely the branding and accessibility that comes with the own party webpage; 
if any voter would want to find out something about a particular party, he/she would very 
likely go to that specific party’s webpage rather than search on the Riigikogu webpage to 
find only a fraction of the overall body of posts and press releases. If these two reasons 
hold true, however, then we have to ask the question why all parties still use the Riigikogu 
webpage. There is clearly no minimum quota per month that must be met, seeing as 
parties occasionally did not post anything for several months in a row. Another question 
that arises under these circumstances is how the parties justify sharing some posts on their 
party webpage and others – albeit fewer – on the parliament website; it would be 
understandable if there would be a strong overlap of articles across the two platforms but 
the overlap is rather small. Again, this is not the habit of one rogue party, this behaviour 
can be observed with all parties.  
As we recall from Figure 6 on page 37, the different parties are also comparably 
homogenous in their choice of topic. One might have expected the Conservative People’s 
Party to create fear over loss of Estonian culture and the security of the nation, or the Free 
Party to be particularly vocal on the economic impact that refugees might have. However, 
with the exception of the Free Party’s constant criticism regarding the lacking 
communication of the government, the distribution is relatively even across all parties.  
The Differences Between the Parties 
 First of all, particularly the Conservative People’s Party and the Free Party have proven 
to be extraordinarily communicative in comparison to the other parties. This activity 
appears to exist for different reasons in the two parties, though: While the Conservative 
People’s Party mostly writes articles directed towards its audience and membership, the 
Free Party seems to use its website for a rather different purpose. Many of the 
contributions that are published on the website are written in a style that makes it sound 
like the author tries to convince his/her own party members just as much as the general 
public. The Free Party’s website has the character of an opinion bazaar, a discussion 
forum in which the party line is still being openly discussed. This is a very plausible 
suggestion; the public’s main criticism towards the still very young Free Party is that it 
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appears to be completely undecided on some issues and openly contradictory on others. 
Without such a foundation it would not have been possible for one party member to write 
the exploitative ahjualused-refugee analogy right next to a lengthy post on how refugees 
may benefit the nation. This phase of determining-the-party-line is paired with a rather 
flat hierarchy style within the party; this stands in stark contrast to the Conservative 
People’s Party which has a rather rigid system of operationalisation and also a very strong 
party line from which party members would neither be willing nor allowed to deviate.  
The Effects of Events on Party Conduct 
The second question which we raised at the very start is whether events have any effect 
on how the different parties communicate and, if so, what effects they have. Within this 
section, there are three main points that we were able to disseminate within this thesis;  
(1) Gruesome terrorist attacks in Europe appeared to create a stronger feeling of 
belonging and connectedness among the Estonian political parties than the more 
emotionally charged pictures of drowned children like Aylan Kurdi;  
(2) Even this reactiveness to terror attacks appears to wear off very quickly – there 
was a detectable drop in expressions of commiseration and compassion between 
the Paris attacks and the Brussels bombings although both were arguably horrible 
atrocities; 
(3) Events in the home country mobilises the political parties the most. After the arson 
at the Vao refugee centre, politicians of all parties rallied to express their causes 
and also push their respective agendas. 
For a political scientist, the natural and intuitive reaction at this point would be to continue 
researching until a proper correlation can be established. A sample size of two terrorist 
attacks on European soil within one year is already disproportionately high, but it still is 
not sufficient for us to draw dependable conclusions from this. Moreover, comparing the 
reactions of Estonian politicians to those of other European politicians would completely 
change the framework, because different cultures react differently to the same event and 
different political systems might not provide us with the same number of parties. Overall, 
these three realisations are very important; having quantifiable and verifiable data on any 
nation’s parties’ reactiveness to certain events can provide a valuable basis for future 
research.  
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Estonian Parties and Hallin’s Spheres 
The main question about the topic of Hallin’s spheres was whether this paradigm could 
be transformed into a more modern understanding of media in which the middlemen, the 
journalists who are supposed to make sure that the discourse stays within reasonable 
boundaries, are cut out. Admittedly, taking the journalist out of Hallin’s spheres 
effectively also means taking the core out of the paradigm. This, however, was necessary 
in order to underline that Hallin’s understanding of how discourse is built up is mistaken 
in its very foundation. Hallin’s visualisation is that journalists are somewhat akin to 
gatekeepers but that gives them more power than they arguably have in an era in which 
print media is faltering under the pressure of internet news services and independent 
reporters who sometimes enjoy more trust than some of the best traditional news agencies.  
It must also be granted that, when Hallin wrote this book in 1986, global Internet and 
instant connectivity were still a distant dream. This does not mean, however, that the 
spheres of deviance, legitimate controversy, and consensus have no academic merit; after 
all, they are still very valuable in the explanation of how sedimented identity can inform 
discourse.  
The political parties who control their own webpages, distribute their own information 
and independently target their audience, are testament to the notion that, on the whole, 
discourse can occur without the journalist-middleman. At the same time, this relative 
independence comes with one trade-off: the party webpages, while they can act freely, 
are still struggling because of very little Internet traffic and if a post contains something 
outrageous, the few traditional journalists that do visit the party webpage on a regular 
basis will still publish articles about the posts that should have stayed hidden from the 
public eye. Ultimately, the Estonian party webpages have developed into a mixed blessing 
where politicians still rely on traditional newspapers for big publicity, but can also 
communicate with their party members and core electorate in a more direct and unfiltered 
fashion. Nonetheless, they are definitely proof that political communication can also work 
without consideration for any middlemen and the target audience in exchange for the 
opportunity to publish straightforward and unabridged opinion pieces about which the 
traditional media outlets can still report as much or little as they desire. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The refugee crisis that used to concern some European countries turned into a pan-
European problem when the EU agreed that all member states should accept and take care 
of some refugees. In April 2015, Estonia was confronted with this reality and its political 
elite, organised in six different parties that are represented in the national parliament, 
started to discuss the issue at hand. 
This thesis set out to map out the positions of the different parties, along with their 
argumentative style, general attitude towards refugees, and main topics that were 
connected with the refugee question. These positions were analysed within a rigid 
framework of quantitative content analysis on two different platforms, first the respective 
party webpage, second the parliament faction section. In this section, the main findings 
were that the refugee crisis evoked a broadly emotional rather than fact-based response 
and that the parties did not focus on their respective expertise, but tied the refugee 
question into different contexts and topics somewhat evenly.  
The second aim of this thesis was to examine how internal and external events 
would affect the discourse among the parties. Through strong contextualisation we were 
able to see that Estonian political parties reacted the more strongly the closer the event 
was to Estonia culturally, but also that compassion and expression of commiseration died 
down quite rapidly between the two terror attacks in Paris and Brussels. Furthermore, the 
topics that were chosen before and after the eventful months between September and 
November showed some differences, proving an internalisation over time. Signs of 
internalisation are worry about one’s own culture and security rather than potential 
matters of interest in outside of one’s own country.  
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In the final part of the thesis, we discussed the party press release as an individual 
type of media and juxtaposed it to Hallin’s spheres in order to find out whether the old 
paradigm still has some validity in the modern, interconnected world. The main finding 
was that, because the Internet enables end-users such as political parties to interact with 
other end-users without outside interference, the journalist has lost his standing as the 
gatekeeper of public discourse.  
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APPENDIX A. Source Table  
Quantitative Content Analysis by Article 
A – Party: (1) EKRE (2) IRL (3) Keskerakond (4) Reformierakond (5) SDE           
(6) Vabaerakond 
B – Platform: (1) Party page (2) Riigikogu 
C – Attitude: (1) Positive (2) Neutral (3) Negative 
D – Style:  (1) Emotions (2) Facts (3) Inaccessible 
E – Topic:  (1) Culture (2) Economy (3) EU (4) Government (5) Liberalism   
  (6) Security (7) Multiple 
 
Pattern:  
Surname, Name. (Date). Original Title. [Translation]. Source.  
Classifications.  
 
Ekre Riigikogu Page 
 
15.05.2015. EKRE vastus ümberasustamise sundkvootidele on kindel ei. [EKRE’s reply 
to compulsory migrant quotas is a firm no].  http://www.riigikogu.ee/fraktsioonide-
teated/eesti-konservatiivse-rahvaerakonna-fraktsioon/ekre-vastus-umberasustamise-
sundkvootidele-on-kindel-ei/  [Accessed 27 Aug 2015]. 
A1. B2. C3. D1. E3. 
 
21.05.2015. Konservatiivide fraktsioon ei tolereeri ei sundkvoote ega ka 
„vabatahtlikkuse“ meetodit. [The Conservative Party does not tolerate compulsory 
quota nor “voluntary” method]. http://www.riigikogu.ee/fraktsioonide-teated/eesti-
konservatiivse-rahvaerakonna-fraktsioon/konservatiivide-fraktsioon-ei-tolereeri-ei-
sundkvoote-ega-ka-vabatahtlikkuse-meetodit/ [Accessed 27 Aug 2016]. 
A1. B2. C3. D1. E3. 
 
09.06.2015. Konservatiivide arupärimine pagulaste teemal lõi Riigikogu saali elevile! 
[The Conservative Party’s interpellation about refugees got the parliament hall excited]. 
http://www.riigikogu.ee/fraktsioonide-teated/eesti-konservatiivse-rahvaerakonna-
fraktsioon/konservatiivide-aruparimine-pagulaste-teemal-loi-riigikogu-saali-elevile/ 
[Accessed 27 Aug 2016]. 
A1. B2. C3. D2. E7. 
 
10.06.2015. Konservatiivid esitasid massimmigratsiooni ennetava eelnõu. [The 
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